Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency
This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the provision of a public good and the structure of a commodity tax system to maximize votes in the election. In this economy the individuals vote choice is determined by parties policies and voters partisan...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Publicado: |
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Azcapotzalco
2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41324545007 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-022&d=41324545007oai |
| Aporte de: |
| id |
I16-R122-41324545007oai |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| institution |
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales |
| institution_str |
I-16 |
| repository_str |
R-122 |
| collection |
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) |
| topic |
Economía y Finanzas Efficiency redistribution public goods elections |
| spellingShingle |
Economía y Finanzas Efficiency redistribution public goods elections Ikuko Kochi Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| topic_facet |
Economía y Finanzas Efficiency redistribution public goods elections |
| description |
This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the provision of a public good and the structure of a commodity tax system to maximize votes in the election. In this economy the individuals vote choice is determined by parties policies and voters partisan preferences. In our model, voters partisan preferences are a form of political heterogeneity that helps to explain the votes distribution in the election and inuences parties scal policy design. It also predicts that left parties have a purely electoral incentive to propose a commodity tax system in which income redistribution plays a more prominent role than efciency in guiding the design of the tax structure and public spending is high. In contrast, right parties have an electoral incentive to weigh less heavily redistribution in tax design and spending is lower compared with the provision of the public good under administrations ruled by left parties. These predictions explain stylized facts suggesting that left (right) parties tend to implement more (less) progressive tax systems. Our paper also contributes to the literature of taxation by providing a new set of empirically veriable propositions on the role of electoral competition on the governments design of a tax structure. |
| format |
Artículo científico Artículo científico |
| author |
Ikuko Kochi Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez |
| author_facet |
Ikuko Kochi Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez |
| author_sort |
Ikuko Kochi |
| title |
Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| title_short |
Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| title_full |
Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| title_fullStr |
Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| title_sort |
electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency |
| publisher |
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Azcapotzalco |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41324545007 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-022&d=41324545007oai |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT ikukokochi electoralcompetitiontaxdesignandthetradeoffbetweenredistributionandefficiency AT raulaponcerodriguez electoralcompetitiontaxdesignandthetradeoffbetweenredistributionandefficiency |
| bdutipo_str |
Repositorios |
| _version_ |
1764820423765131264 |