Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil

In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may no...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Carlos Pereira, Bernardo Mueller
Formato: Artículo científico
Publicado: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2002
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845204
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21845204oai
Aporte de:
id I16-R122-21845204oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
topic Sociología
executive-legislative
Brazil
budgetary process
coalition-based presidential system
spellingShingle Sociología
executive-legislative
Brazil
budgetary process
coalition-based presidential system
Carlos Pereira
Bernardo Mueller
Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
topic_facet Sociología
executive-legislative
Brazil
budgetary process
coalition-based presidential system
description In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also the executive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not only restrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at low costs its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the Brazilian President rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests by executing their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally, punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments.
format Artículo científico
Artículo científico
author Carlos Pereira
Bernardo Mueller
author_facet Carlos Pereira
Bernardo Mueller
author_sort Carlos Pereira
title Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
title_short Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
title_full Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
title_fullStr Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
title_full_unstemmed Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
title_sort strategic behavior in a coalition-based presidential system: executive-legislative relations in the budgetary process in brazil
publisher Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
publishDate 2002
url http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845204
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21845204oai
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