Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System

This article argues that the Brazilian President’s lawmaking powers, especially related to budget-making, crucially modify the incentives for more or less cooperative behavior among House members vis-à-vis their respective party representations in Congress, comparing the two democratic periods in Br...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Fabiano Santos
Formato: Artículo científico
Publicado: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2002
Materias:
Sociología
parties
committees
presidentialism coalition
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845203
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21845203oai
Aporte de:
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
id I16-R122-21845203oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
topic Sociología
parties
committees
presidentialism coalition
spellingShingle Sociología
parties
committees
presidentialism coalition
Fabiano Santos
Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
topic_facet Sociología
parties
committees
presidentialism coalition
description This article argues that the Brazilian President’s lawmaking powers, especially related to budget-making, crucially modify the incentives for more or less cooperative behavior among House members vis-à-vis their respective party representations in Congress, comparing the two democratic periods in Brazil: 1946-64 and post-1988. During the former period, given the President’s reduced agenda powers, Congress had greater freedom to define its approach to the President’s policy program without running the risk of retaliation in the form of lost patronage and budget resources. During the post-1988 period, since budget-making initiative is concentrated in the hands of the Executive Branch, the President’s bargaining power has expanded, requiring Congress to organize in more disciplined parties in order to more efficiently pressure the Administration to comply with agreements for mutual support. The study’s empirical section begins by identifying the pattern of coalitions that allowed for the developmentalist project in the 1950s as contrasted with the partisan coalition pattern that approved the constitutional reforms during the Cardoso Administration. The second section analyzes the parties’ policies towards the composition of crucial standing committees, demonstrating the impact of party loyalty on obtaining seats in the Committee on the Constitution and the Judiciary and the Committee on Finances and Taxation. The impact of party loyalty was significant in the former period and non-significant in the latter.
format Artículo científico
Artículo científico
author Fabiano Santos
author_facet Fabiano Santos
author_sort Fabiano Santos
title Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
title_short Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
title_full Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
title_fullStr Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
title_full_unstemmed Parties and Committees in the Coalition Presidential System
title_sort parties and committees in the coalition presidential system
publisher Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
publishDate 2002
url http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845203
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21845203oai
work_keys_str_mv AT fabianosantos partiesandcommitteesinthecoalitionpresidentialsystem
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820420648763397

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