Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?

In the largest antitrust case prosecuted in Peru during the 2000s, the competition authority fined three firms for colluding to supply oxygen to Social Security hospitals (ESSALUD). At first the case looked simple: between 1999 and 2002 these firms won tenders in the same geographical areas in proce...

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Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Defilippi, Enzo
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: 2014
Materias:
Libre competencia
Prácticas restrictivas de la competencia
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11354/384
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pe/pe-014&d=11354384oai
Aporte de:
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
id I16-R122-11354384oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
language Español
topic Libre competencia
Prácticas restrictivas de la competencia
spellingShingle Libre competencia
Prácticas restrictivas de la competencia
Defilippi, Enzo
Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
topic_facet Libre competencia
Prácticas restrictivas de la competencia
description In the largest antitrust case prosecuted in Peru during the 2000s, the competition authority fined three firms for colluding to supply oxygen to Social Security hospitals (ESSALUD). At first the case looked simple: between 1999 and 2002 these firms won tenders in the same geographical areas in processes where the other two bidders always disqualified themselves. Moreover, this is an industry with a history of anticompetitive practices, since producers of industrial and medical gases have been found guilty of collusion in several countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the European Union. However, a deeper look at the economic evidence of the case shows that it was not conclusive, since the collusion hypothesis cannot explain key facts: the reason for which the firms disqualified themselves, since the others did not require it to win the tenders; the reason why the firms would maintain a collusive agreement that could not provide higher benefits than competition; and the price evidence that shows ESSALUD was exerting market power at the same time it was the supposed victim of a collusion. Likewise, the collusion hypothesis implies that the behavior of the firms was irrational, since i) a producer representing 85% of the market colluded with two firms representing 10% and 5%, ii) to allow them to gain market share at its expense, iii) to sell the product at increasingly lower prices than those paid by the rest of buyers, iv) through contracts obtained bidding the lowest possible price. This paper argues the collusion could not be proven and thus, the case should have been dropped.
format Libro
Libro
author Defilippi, Enzo
author_facet Defilippi, Enzo
author_sort Defilippi, Enzo
title Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
title_short Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
title_full Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
title_fullStr Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
title_full_unstemmed Colusión sin evidencia directa en el Perú ¿la sospecha basta?
title_sort colusión sin evidencia directa en el perú ¿la sospecha basta?
publishDate 2014
url http://hdl.handle.net/11354/384
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pe/pe-014&d=11354384oai
work_keys_str_mv AT defilippienzo colusionsinevidenciadirectaenelperulasospechabasta
bdutipo_str Repositorios
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