Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, su...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: André, P., Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine
Formato: text
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: DIAL 2011
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010061542
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=fr/fr-001&d=010061542oai
Aporte de:
id I16-R122-010061542oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
language EN
topic INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC
DEPENSES PUBLIQUES
DEMOCRATIE
ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
DECENTRALISATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
ELECTION
ECONOMETRIE
HISTOIRE POLITIQUE
BIEN PUBLIC
DEMOCRATISATION
spellingShingle INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC
DEPENSES PUBLIQUES
DEMOCRATIE
ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
DECENTRALISATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
ELECTION
ECONOMETRIE
HISTOIRE POLITIQUE
BIEN PUBLIC
DEMOCRATISATION
André, P.
Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
topic_facet INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC
DEPENSES PUBLIQUES
DEMOCRATIE
ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
DECENTRALISATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
ELECTION
ECONOMETRIE
HISTOIRE POLITIQUE
BIEN PUBLIC
DEMOCRATISATION
description The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.
format text
text
author André, P.
Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine
author_facet André, P.
Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine
author_sort André, P.
title Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
title_short Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
title_full Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
title_fullStr Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
title_full_unstemmed Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
title_sort politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of ghana, 1996-2004
publisher DIAL
publishDate 2011
url http://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010061542
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=fr/fr-001&d=010061542oai
work_keys_str_mv AT andrep politicsandthegeographicallocationofpublicfundsinasemidemocracythecaseofghana19962004
AT mesplesompssandrine politicsandthegeographicallocationofpublicfundsinasemidemocracythecaseofghana19962004
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820414723260420