Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004
The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, su...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | text |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
DIAL
2011
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010061542 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=fr/fr-001&d=010061542oai |
| Aporte de: |
| id |
I16-R122-010061542oai |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| institution |
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales |
| institution_str |
I-16 |
| repository_str |
R-122 |
| collection |
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) |
| language |
EN |
| topic |
INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC DEPENSES PUBLIQUES DEMOCRATIE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DECENTRALISATION INFRASTRUCTURE ELECTION ECONOMETRIE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE BIEN PUBLIC DEMOCRATISATION |
| spellingShingle |
INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC DEPENSES PUBLIQUES DEMOCRATIE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DECENTRALISATION INFRASTRUCTURE ELECTION ECONOMETRIE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE BIEN PUBLIC DEMOCRATISATION André, P. Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| topic_facet |
INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC DEPENSES PUBLIQUES DEMOCRATIE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DECENTRALISATION INFRASTRUCTURE ELECTION ECONOMETRIE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE BIEN PUBLIC DEMOCRATISATION |
| description |
The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either. |
| format |
text text |
| author |
André, P. Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine |
| author_facet |
André, P. Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine |
| author_sort |
André, P. |
| title |
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| title_short |
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| title_full |
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| title_fullStr |
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of Ghana, 1996-2004 |
| title_sort |
politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy : the case of ghana, 1996-2004 |
| publisher |
DIAL |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
http://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:010061542 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=fr/fr-001&d=010061542oai |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT andrep politicsandthegeographicallocationofpublicfundsinasemidemocracythecaseofghana19962004 AT mesplesompssandrine politicsandthegeographicallocationofpublicfundsinasemidemocracythecaseofghana19962004 |
| bdutipo_str |
Repositorios |
| _version_ |
1764820414723260420 |