Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoni...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/54 |
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Universidad Nacional de Rosario |
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Artículo revista |
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sesgo de confirmación toma de decisiones teorÃas de procesamiento dual psicologÃa evolucionista razonamiento motivado elección basada en razones razonamiento argumentación confirmation bias decision making dual process theory evolutionary psychology motivated reasoning reasoning argumentation reason-based choice |
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sesgo de confirmación toma de decisiones teorÃas de procesamiento dual psicologÃa evolucionista razonamiento motivado elección basada en razones razonamiento argumentación confirmation bias decision making dual process theory evolutionary psychology motivated reasoning reasoning argumentation reason-based choice Mercier, Hugo Sperber, Dan Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
| topic_facet |
sesgo de confirmación toma de decisiones teorÃas de procesamiento dual psicologÃa evolucionista razonamiento motivado elección basada en razones razonamiento argumentación confirmation bias decision making dual process theory evolutionary psychology motivated reasoning reasoning argumentation reason-based choice |
| author |
Mercier, Hugo Sperber, Dan |
| author_facet |
Mercier, Hugo Sperber, Dan |
| author_sort |
Mercier, Hugo |
| title |
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
| title_short |
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
| title_full |
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory |
| title_sort |
why do humans reason? arguments for an argumentative theory |
| description |
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found. |
| publisher |
Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/54 |
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2023-06-26T22:47:34Z |
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I15-R231-article-542020-09-11T14:32:54Z Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory ¿Porqué razonan los humanos? Argumentos para una Teoría Argumentativa Mercier, Hugo Sperber, Dan sesgo de confirmación toma de decisiones teorÃas de procesamiento dual psicologÃa evolucionista razonamiento motivado elección basada en razones razonamiento argumentación confirmation bias decision making dual process theory evolutionary psychology motivated reasoning reasoning argumentation reason-based choice Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found. Por lo general se considera al razonamiento como un medio para mejorar el conocimiento y tomar mejores decisiones. Sin embargo, hay mucha evidencia que muestra que el razonamiento a menudo conduce a distorsiones epistémicas y a malas decisiones. Esto sugiere que la función del razonamiento debe ser repensada. Nuestra hipótesis es que la función del razonamiento es argumentativa: concebir y evaluar los argumentos destinados a persuadir. Concebido de esa manera, el razonamiento es adaptativo dada la excepcional dependencia que tienen los humanos de la comunicación y dada su vulnerabilidad a la desinformación. Un amplio rango de evidencia de la psicología del razonamiento y la toma de decisiones puede ser reinterpretada y puede ser explicada en forma más fructífera a la luz de esta hipótesis. El mal desempeño en las tareas estándar de razonamiento se explica por la falta de contexto argumentativo. Cuando los mismos problemas se colocan en un contexto argumentativo adecuado, las personas resultan ser argumentadores hábiles. Sin embargo, los argumentadores hábiles no están en busca de la verdad, sino de argumentos que apoyen sus opiniones. Esto explica el notorio sesgo de confirmación. Este sesgo es evidente no sólo cuando la gente está argumentando, sino también cuando razonan proactivamente desde la perspectiva de tener que defender sus opiniones. El razonamiento motivado de esta forma puede distorsionar las evaluaciones y actitudes y permitir que persistan las creencias erróneas. El razonamiento utilizado proactivamente también favorece las decisiones que son fáciles de justificar pero que no son necesariamente las mejores. En todos estos casos, tradicionalmente descritos como fallos o defectos, el razonamiento hace exactamente lo que se puede esperar de un dispositivo argumentativo: buscar argumentos que apoyen una conclusión dada, y, ceteris paribus, favorecer las conclusiones para las que se pueden encontrar argumentos. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2019-12-27 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Translations of articles previously unpublished in Spanish Traducciones de artículos inéditos en español application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/54 10.35305/cf2.vi15.54 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 15 (2018) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 15 (2018) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/54/51 Derechos de autor 2019 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0 |