Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe

This paper reconstructs the two main versions of skepticism about legal duties —expressivism and error theory— based on the theses developed by the Uppsala school, particularly Axel Hägerström. After clarifying these two positions, the article addresses two central objections to skepticism. The firs...

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Autor principal: Arena, Federico
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025
Materias:
Escepticismo jurídico
Expresivismo
Teoría del error
Deberes jurídicos
Axel Hägerström
Legal Skepticism
Expressivism
Error Theory
Legal duties
Acceso en línea:https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/281
Aporte de:
Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR) de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R231-article-281
record_format ojs
spelling I15-R231-article-2812025-12-22T22:55:13Z Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe Escepticismo acerca de deberes jurídicos Entre el expresivismo y la teoría del error Arena, Federico Escepticismo jurídico Expresivismo Teoría del error Deberes jurídicos Axel Hägerström Legal Skepticism Expressivism Error Theory Legal duties Axel Hägerström This paper reconstructs the two main versions of skepticism about legal duties —expressivism and error theory— based on the theses developed by the Uppsala school, particularly Axel Hägerström. After clarifying these two positions, the article addresses two central objections to skepticism. The first, raised by Hart, argues that skepticism fails to account for the linguistic intentions of judges when they utter statements of duties. The second, raised by Dworkin, challenges the distinction between first-order (committed) and second-order (theoretical) discourse on which skepticism relies. The paper responds to both critiques and argues that, despite such challenges, skeptical positions remain philosophically viable within legal discourse. Este trabajo ofrece una reconstrucción de las dos principales versiones del escepticismo acerca de los deberes jurídicos —el expresivismo y la teoría del error— a partir de las tesis desarrolladas por la escuela de Uppsala, en particular por Axel Hägerström. Luego de caracterizar ambas posiciones, el artículo examina dos objeciones centrales al escepticismo. La primera, atribuida a Hart, sostiene que el escepticismo no puede dar cuenta de las intenciones lingüísticas de los jueces al formular enunciados de deber. La segunda, desarrollada por Dworkin, cuestiona la distinción entre niveles de discurso (comprometido vs. teórico) en la que se apoya el escepticismo. El texto ofrece respuestas a ambas objeciones y sugiere que, pese a las críticas, el escepticismo continúa siendo filosóficamente viable dentro del discurso jurídico. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025-12-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/281 10.35305/cf2.vi22.281 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 22 (2025) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 22 (2025) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/281/219 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-231
container_title_str Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Escepticismo jurídico
Expresivismo
Teoría del error
Deberes jurídicos
Axel Hägerström
Legal Skepticism
Expressivism
Error Theory
Legal duties
Axel Hägerström
spellingShingle Escepticismo jurídico
Expresivismo
Teoría del error
Deberes jurídicos
Axel Hägerström
Legal Skepticism
Expressivism
Error Theory
Legal duties
Axel Hägerström
Arena, Federico
Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
topic_facet Escepticismo jurídico
Expresivismo
Teoría del error
Deberes jurídicos
Axel Hägerström
Legal Skepticism
Expressivism
Error Theory
Legal duties
Axel Hägerström
author Arena, Federico
author_facet Arena, Federico
author_sort Arena, Federico
title Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
title_short Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
title_full Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
title_fullStr Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
title_full_unstemmed Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
title_sort skepticism about legal duties between expressivism and error theorythe
description This paper reconstructs the two main versions of skepticism about legal duties —expressivism and error theory— based on the theses developed by the Uppsala school, particularly Axel Hägerström. After clarifying these two positions, the article addresses two central objections to skepticism. The first, raised by Hart, argues that skepticism fails to account for the linguistic intentions of judges when they utter statements of duties. The second, raised by Dworkin, challenges the distinction between first-order (committed) and second-order (theoretical) discourse on which skepticism relies. The paper responds to both critiques and argues that, despite such challenges, skeptical positions remain philosophically viable within legal discourse.
publisher Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2025
url https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/281
work_keys_str_mv AT arenafederico skepticismaboutlegaldutiesbetweenexpressivismanderrortheorythe
AT arenafederico escepticismoacercadedeberesjuridicosentreelexpresivismoylateoriadelerror
first_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:13Z
last_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:13Z
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