Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Gilbert Ryle devoted much of his work to emphasizing the distinctive nature of know-how, offering a critique of Cartesian and intellectualist models of mind, knowledge, and behavior. He underscored its essential connection to training: unlike know-that or moral virtues, know-how requires not only le...

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Autor principal: Mondaca, Sofía
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025
Materias:
Saber-cómo
Entrenamiento
Estándares normativos
Umbral de éxito
Know-how
Training
Normative standards
Success standards
Acceso en línea:https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/277
Aporte de:
Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR) de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R231-article-277
record_format ojs
spelling I15-R231-article-2772025-12-22T22:55:14Z Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective Entrenamiento y evaluación del saber-cómo desde una perspectiva wittgensteiniana Mondaca, Sofía Saber-cómo Entrenamiento Estándares normativos Umbral de éxito Know-how Training Normative standards Success standards Gilbert Ryle devoted much of his work to emphasizing the distinctive nature of know-how, offering a critique of Cartesian and intellectualist models of mind, knowledge, and behavior. He underscored its essential connection to training: unlike know-that or moral virtues, know-how requires not only learning but also sustained practice to avoid being forgotten (1958/2009d). Whereas learning allows for the acquisition of skills, training keeps them active, refines them, and adapts them to new situations. This conception has influenced several contemporary anti-intellectualist models, the most prominent being that of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). According to them, know-how is not acquired by following explicit rules, but through the sedimentation of successful experiences that generate dispositions to act skillfully. In this article, we present and critique their model, arguing that it fails to capture the epistemic dimension of know-how. Instead, we propose a pragmatist framework grounded in a Wittgensteinian analysis of training, which, we suggest, offers a more accurate account of know-how as embedded within normatively structured social practices. From this perspective, training not only preserves and enhances skills, but also involves aligning with shared standards—thereby highlighting its normative character and clarifying the criteria that guide and regulate its exercise. Gilbert Ryle dedicó gran parte de su obra a destacar la naturaleza particular del saber-cómo, en crítica a los modelos cartesianos e intelectualistas de la mente, el conocimiento y el comportamiento. Subrayó su vínculo esencial con el entrenamiento: a diferencia del saber-que o de las virtudes morales, el saber-cómo requiere no solo aprendizaje, sino también una práctica sostenida para no ser olvidado (1958/2009d). Mientras el aprendizaje permite adquirir habilidades, el entrenamiento las mantiene activas, las perfecciona y las adapta a nuevas situaciones. Esta concepción ha influido en modelos anti-intelectualistas contemporáneos. El más famoso es el propuesto por Dreyfus y Dreyfus (1986), quienes sostienen que el saber-cómo no implica el seguimiento de reglas explícitas, sino la sedimentación de experiencias exitosas que generan disposiciones para actuar habilidosamente. En este artículo, expondremos y criticaremos este modelo por no captar adecuadamente la dimensión epistémica del saber-cómo. Propondremos, en cambio, un enfoque pragmatista basado en un análisis wittgensteiniano del entrenamiento, que permite comprender el saber-cómo como inserto en prácticas sociales normativamente estructuradas. Desde esta perspectiva, el entrenamiento no solo preserva y mejora habilidades, sino que también implica el ajuste a estándares compartidos, lo cual ilumina su carácter normativo y permite comprender los criterios que orientan y regulan su ejercicio. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025-12-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/277 10.35305/cf2.vi22.277 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 22 (2025) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 22 (2025) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/277/210 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-231
container_title_str Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Saber-cómo
Entrenamiento
Estándares normativos
Umbral de éxito
Know-how
Training
Normative standards
Success standards
spellingShingle Saber-cómo
Entrenamiento
Estándares normativos
Umbral de éxito
Know-how
Training
Normative standards
Success standards
Mondaca, Sofía
Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
topic_facet Saber-cómo
Entrenamiento
Estándares normativos
Umbral de éxito
Know-how
Training
Normative standards
Success standards
author Mondaca, Sofía
author_facet Mondaca, Sofía
author_sort Mondaca, Sofía
title Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
title_short Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
title_full Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
title_fullStr Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
title_full_unstemmed Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
title_sort training and assessment of know-how from a wittgensteinian perspective
description Gilbert Ryle devoted much of his work to emphasizing the distinctive nature of know-how, offering a critique of Cartesian and intellectualist models of mind, knowledge, and behavior. He underscored its essential connection to training: unlike know-that or moral virtues, know-how requires not only learning but also sustained practice to avoid being forgotten (1958/2009d). Whereas learning allows for the acquisition of skills, training keeps them active, refines them, and adapts them to new situations. This conception has influenced several contemporary anti-intellectualist models, the most prominent being that of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). According to them, know-how is not acquired by following explicit rules, but through the sedimentation of successful experiences that generate dispositions to act skillfully. In this article, we present and critique their model, arguing that it fails to capture the epistemic dimension of know-how. Instead, we propose a pragmatist framework grounded in a Wittgensteinian analysis of training, which, we suggest, offers a more accurate account of know-how as embedded within normatively structured social practices. From this perspective, training not only preserves and enhances skills, but also involves aligning with shared standards—thereby highlighting its normative character and clarifying the criteria that guide and regulate its exercise.
publisher Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2025
url https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/277
work_keys_str_mv AT mondacasofia trainingandassessmentofknowhowfromawittgensteinianperspective
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first_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:12Z
last_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:12Z
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