A logical theory about conditional will
Medieval logicians, like contemporary logicians, learned to use logic to solve philosophical problems. Problems generated by the concept of will were no exception. In this paper we explore one of its aspects: statements of will, when they are expressed conditionally (voluntas conditionalis). Whoever...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/264 |
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| Sumario: | Medieval logicians, like contemporary logicians, learned to use logic to solve philosophical problems. Problems generated by the concept of will were no exception. In this paper we explore one of its aspects: statements of will, when they are expressed conditionally (voluntas conditionalis). Whoever states: “If I want my children to study, I will have to work longer” is expressing his will conditionally. Does he want to do both things? Or just one of them? Conditional will presents logical and theological problems. Buridan gives us, in the insoluble eighteenth of his Sophimata, a way of understanding conditional will that a) allows us to get rid of the paradox to which will expressed conditionally can lead us; b) allows us to logically articulate the solution to a problem with this type of statement, posed by William of Auxerre. In this paper we present an overview of the logical treatment of the will and its associated concepts. We then present, explain, and analyze Buridan's logical solution to the problem of conditional will. We place Buridan's solution in a broader context, given by the medieval readings of Matthew 26:39 and Philippians 1:23. |
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