A logical theory about conditional will

Medieval logicians, like contemporary logicians, learned to use logic to solve philosophical problems. Problems generated by the concept of will were no exception. In this paper we explore one of its aspects: statements of will, when they are expressed conditionally (voluntas conditionalis). Whoever...

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Autor principal: Dahlquist, Manuel
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025
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Acceso en línea:https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/264
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spelling I15-R231-article-2642025-08-19T13:30:20Z A logical theory about conditional will Una teoría lógica acerca de la voluntad condicional Dahlquist, Manuel Buridán Voluntad Condicionales Lógica Medieval Insolubles Buridan Will Conditionals Medieval Logic Insolubles Medieval logicians, like contemporary logicians, learned to use logic to solve philosophical problems. Problems generated by the concept of will were no exception. In this paper we explore one of its aspects: statements of will, when they are expressed conditionally (voluntas conditionalis). Whoever states: “If I want my children to study, I will have to work longer” is expressing his will conditionally. Does he want to do both things? Or just one of them? Conditional will presents logical and theological problems. Buridan gives us, in the insoluble eighteenth of his Sophimata, a way of understanding conditional will that a) allows us to get rid of the paradox to which will expressed conditionally can lead us; b) allows us to logically articulate the solution to a problem with this type of statement, posed by William of Auxerre. In this paper we present an overview of the logical treatment of the will and its associated concepts. We then present, explain, and analyze Buridan's logical solution to the problem of conditional will. We place Buridan's solution in a broader context, given by the medieval readings of Matthew 26:39 and Philippians 1:23. Los lógicos medievales, como los lógicos contemporáneos, aprendieron a utilizar la lógica para solucionar problemas filosóficos. Los problemas generados por el concepto de voluntad no fueron la excepción. En este trabajo exploramos una de sus aristas: los enunciados de voluntad, cuando son expresados de manera condicional (voluntas conditionalis). Quien enuncia: “Si quiero que mis hijos estudien, tendré que trabajar más tiempo” está expresando su voluntad de manera condicional. Quien enuncia la proposición anterior: ¿Tiene voluntad de hacer ambas cosas? ¿O sólo una de ellas? La voluntad condicional presenta problemas lógicos y teológicos. Buridán nos brinda, en el decimoctavo insoluble de su Sophimata, una manera de entender la voluntad condicional que a) permite librarse de la paradoja a la que puede conducirnos la voluntad expresada de manera condicional; b) permite presentar lógicamente la solución a un problema con este tipo de enunciados, planteado por Guillermo de Auxerre. En este trabajo presentamos un panorama general del tratamiento lógico de la voluntad y sus conceptos asociados. Luego presentamos, explicamos, y analizamos la solución lógica de Buridán al problema de la voluntad condicional. Incluimos la solución en un contexto más amplio, dado por las lecturas medievales de Mateo 26:39 y Filipenses 1:23. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025-08-19 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/264 10.35305/cf2.vi21.264 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 21 (2024) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 21 (2024) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/264/205 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-231
container_title_str Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Buridán
Voluntad
Condicionales
Lógica Medieval
Insolubles
Buridan
Will
Conditionals
Medieval Logic
Insolubles
spellingShingle Buridán
Voluntad
Condicionales
Lógica Medieval
Insolubles
Buridan
Will
Conditionals
Medieval Logic
Insolubles
Dahlquist, Manuel
A logical theory about conditional will
topic_facet Buridán
Voluntad
Condicionales
Lógica Medieval
Insolubles
Buridan
Will
Conditionals
Medieval Logic
Insolubles
author Dahlquist, Manuel
author_facet Dahlquist, Manuel
author_sort Dahlquist, Manuel
title A logical theory about conditional will
title_short A logical theory about conditional will
title_full A logical theory about conditional will
title_fullStr A logical theory about conditional will
title_full_unstemmed A logical theory about conditional will
title_sort logical theory about conditional will
description Medieval logicians, like contemporary logicians, learned to use logic to solve philosophical problems. Problems generated by the concept of will were no exception. In this paper we explore one of its aspects: statements of will, when they are expressed conditionally (voluntas conditionalis). Whoever states: “If I want my children to study, I will have to work longer” is expressing his will conditionally. Does he want to do both things? Or just one of them? Conditional will presents logical and theological problems. Buridan gives us, in the insoluble eighteenth of his Sophimata, a way of understanding conditional will that a) allows us to get rid of the paradox to which will expressed conditionally can lead us; b) allows us to logically articulate the solution to a problem with this type of statement, posed by William of Auxerre. In this paper we present an overview of the logical treatment of the will and its associated concepts. We then present, explain, and analyze Buridan's logical solution to the problem of conditional will. We place Buridan's solution in a broader context, given by the medieval readings of Matthew 26:39 and Philippians 1:23.
publisher Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2025
url https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/264
work_keys_str_mv AT dahlquistmanuel alogicaltheoryaboutconditionalwill
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first_indexed 2025-09-04T05:02:40Z
last_indexed 2025-09-04T05:02:40Z
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