Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
Among the questions and answers about the problem of the freedom of the will, Thomas Aquinas is generally depicted both as an intellectualist and as an author inspired by the Aristotle’s writings. However, concerning the problem of the cause of action, in which the cognitive and desiderative faculti...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/252 |
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| Sumario: | Among the questions and answers about the problem of the freedom of the will, Thomas Aquinas is generally depicted both as an intellectualist and as an author inspired by the Aristotle’s writings. However, concerning the problem of the cause of action, in which the cognitive and desiderative faculties are evaluated as candidates, some contemporary interpreters of the Greek philosopher do not seem to agree with the hypothesis that reason could be the original cause of action, given that, in their view Aristotle argues in favour of the primacy to desires, especially in De Anima III 10, 433a 21-26. If Aristotle favours desires as the causes of action, how should the influence of Aristotle in Thomas Aquinas be considered, given that he extensively commented on the De Anima and other of his works? The hypothesis of the present work is that the medieval thinker defends as the principal cause of human movement the object of desire, in which there is a concomitance of desiderative and cognitive capacities. Besides that, Thomas Aquinas does not seem to force the Latin text of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle, which differs from contemporary translations of the De anima. |
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