Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26

Among the questions and answers about the problem of the freedom of the will, Thomas Aquinas is generally depicted both as an intellectualist and as an author inspired by the Aristotle’s writings. However, concerning the problem of the cause of action, in which the cognitive and desiderative faculti...

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Autor principal: Konzen Capra, Pedro
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025
Materias:
Aristóteles
Tomás de Aquino
Causa de la acción
Intelecto
Deseo
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Cause of action
Intellect
Desire
Acceso en línea:https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/252
Aporte de:
Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR) de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R231-article-252
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spelling I15-R231-article-2522025-08-19T14:24:02Z Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26 Appetibile y el punto de partida del intelecto práctico: El comentario de Tomás de Aquino al pasaje 433a 14-26 del De Anima de Aristóteles Konzen Capra, Pedro Aristóteles Tomás de Aquino Causa de la acción Intelecto Deseo Aristotle Thomas Aquinas Cause of action Intellect Desire Among the questions and answers about the problem of the freedom of the will, Thomas Aquinas is generally depicted both as an intellectualist and as an author inspired by the Aristotle’s writings. However, concerning the problem of the cause of action, in which the cognitive and desiderative faculties are evaluated as candidates, some contemporary interpreters of the Greek philosopher do not seem to agree with the hypothesis that reason could be the original cause of action, given that, in their view Aristotle argues in favour of the primacy to desires, especially in De Anima III 10, 433a 21-26. If Aristotle favours desires as the causes of action, how should the influence of Aristotle in Thomas Aquinas be considered, given that he extensively commented on the De Anima and other of his works? The hypothesis of the present work is that the medieval thinker defends as the principal cause of human movement the object of desire, in which there is a concomitance of desiderative and cognitive capacities. Besides that, Thomas Aquinas does not seem to force the Latin text of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle, which differs from contemporary translations of the De anima. En el conjunto de preguntas y respuestas relativas al problema de la libertad de la voluntad, Tomás de Aquino es generalmente presentado como un intelectualista y como un autor inspirado en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, cuando se trata del problema de la causa de la acción, en el que las facultades cognoscitivas y desiderativas son evaluadas como candidatas, algunos intérpretes contemporáneos del filósofo griego no parecen estar de acuerdo con la hipótesis de que la razón sea la causa originaria de la acción, en la medida en que consideran que Aristóteles tiene argumentos que dan primacía a los deseos, especialmente en De Anima III 10, 433a 21-26. Si Aristóteles defiende argumentos en defensa de la primacía de los deseos en el problema de la causa de la acción, ¿Cómo debe considerarse la calidad de la influencia de Aristóteles en Tomás de Aquino, dado que éste comentó extensamente De Anima y otras obras relacionadas de Aristóteles? La hipótesis de este trabajo es que el pensador medieval considera el objeto del deseo como la causa principal del movimiento humano, en el que hay una concomitancia de capacidades desiderativas y cognitivas. A pesar de ello, Tomás de Aquino no parece forzar el texto latino de Aristóteles traducido por Guillermo de Moerbeke, quien, a su vez, lo tradujo de forma diferente a las ediciones contemporáneas de De Anima. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025-08-12 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/252 10.35305/cf2.vi21.252 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 21 (2024) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 21 (2024) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/252/194 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-231
container_title_str Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Aristóteles
Tomás de Aquino
Causa de la acción
Intelecto
Deseo
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Cause of action
Intellect
Desire
spellingShingle Aristóteles
Tomás de Aquino
Causa de la acción
Intelecto
Deseo
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Cause of action
Intellect
Desire
Konzen Capra, Pedro
Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
topic_facet Aristóteles
Tomás de Aquino
Causa de la acción
Intelecto
Deseo
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Cause of action
Intellect
Desire
author Konzen Capra, Pedro
author_facet Konzen Capra, Pedro
author_sort Konzen Capra, Pedro
title Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
title_short Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
title_full Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
title_fullStr Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
title_full_unstemmed Appetibile and the Starting Point of the Practical Intellect: Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 433a 14–26
title_sort appetibile and the starting point of the practical intellect: thomas aquinas’s commentary on aristotle’s de anima 433a 14–26
description Among the questions and answers about the problem of the freedom of the will, Thomas Aquinas is generally depicted both as an intellectualist and as an author inspired by the Aristotle’s writings. However, concerning the problem of the cause of action, in which the cognitive and desiderative faculties are evaluated as candidates, some contemporary interpreters of the Greek philosopher do not seem to agree with the hypothesis that reason could be the original cause of action, given that, in their view Aristotle argues in favour of the primacy to desires, especially in De Anima III 10, 433a 21-26. If Aristotle favours desires as the causes of action, how should the influence of Aristotle in Thomas Aquinas be considered, given that he extensively commented on the De Anima and other of his works? The hypothesis of the present work is that the medieval thinker defends as the principal cause of human movement the object of desire, in which there is a concomitance of desiderative and cognitive capacities. Besides that, Thomas Aquinas does not seem to force the Latin text of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle, which differs from contemporary translations of the De anima.
publisher Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2025
url https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/252
work_keys_str_mv AT konzencaprapedro appetibileandthestartingpointofthepracticalintellectthomasaquinasscommentaryonaristotlesdeanima433a1426
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first_indexed 2025-09-04T05:02:37Z
last_indexed 2025-09-04T05:02:37Z
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