Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
TThe basis of this paper is an analysis of el-Sisi’s Egypt’s autocratic promotion of Libya and Tunisia. At the structural level, the paper is divided into three parts: in the first, Egyptian autocracy promotion is analyzed at the empirical level in Libya and Tunisia. As for Libya, rewards prevailed...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/103 |
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| Sumario: | TThe basis of this paper is an analysis of el-Sisi’s Egypt’s autocratic promotion of Libya and Tunisia. At the structural level, the paper is divided into three parts: in the first, Egyptian autocracy promotion is analyzed at the empirical level in Libya and Tunisia. As for Libya, rewards prevailed (training the armed forces and selling weapons), although there has been blackmail against Marshal Haftar. Egyptian rewards in Tunisia have been weaker than in Libya: they have been mainly diplomatic. That is why it is possible to affirm that there has been a strong emulation of Saïed towards el-Sisi. The paper then goes on to place the two cases within Fossati’s (2022) typology. Therefore, it is possible to come to the conclusion that Egyptian autocracy promotion in Libya was rigid until 2020, when el-Sisi only supported Haftar, but became flexible after 2020, when el-Sisi began to negotiate with the government in Tripoli. In both cases we have soft power relations. As for Tunisia, Egyptian autocracy promotion is flexible with soft power relations. Finally, an interesting assessment is presented concerning the relationship between values and interests in el-Sisi’s foreign policy in the two countries analyzed. Egyptian autocracy promotion has indeed almost always been ideological, both in Libya and in Tunisia, although interests have come into play in the second phase in Libya, when el-Sisi moderated his position and began the negotiations with the Tripoli government. |
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