Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia

TThe basis of this paper is an analysis of el-Sisi’s Egypt’s autocratic promotion of Libya and Tunisia. At the structural level, the paper is divided into three parts: in the first, Egyptian autocracy promotion is analyzed at the empirical level in Libya and Tunisia. As for Libya, rewards prevailed...

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Autor principal: Michelutto, Lisa
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2023
Materias:
Promozione dell’autocrazia
politica estera
Egitto
Medio Oriente
conflitti
Autocracy promotion
foreign policy
Egypt
Middle East
conflicts
Acceso en línea:https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/103
Aporte de:
RELASP de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R205-article-103
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spelling I15-R205-article-1032023-04-11T03:13:32Z Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia Promozione dell’autocrazia egiziana in Libia e Tunisia Michelutto, Lisa Promozione dell’autocrazia politica estera Egitto Medio Oriente conflitti Autocracy promotion foreign policy Egypt Middle East conflicts TThe basis of this paper is an analysis of el-Sisi’s Egypt’s autocratic promotion of Libya and Tunisia. At the structural level, the paper is divided into three parts: in the first, Egyptian autocracy promotion is analyzed at the empirical level in Libya and Tunisia. As for Libya, rewards prevailed (training the armed forces and selling weapons), although there has been blackmail against Marshal Haftar. Egyptian rewards in Tunisia have been weaker than in Libya: they have been mainly diplomatic. That is why it is possible to affirm that there has been a strong emulation of Saïed towards el-Sisi. The paper then goes on to place the two cases within Fossati’s (2022) typology. Therefore, it is possible to come to the conclusion that Egyptian autocracy promotion in Libya was rigid until 2020, when el-Sisi only supported Haftar, but became flexible after 2020, when el-Sisi began to negotiate with the government in Tripoli. In both cases we have soft power relations. As for Tunisia, Egyptian autocracy promotion is flexible with soft power relations. Finally, an interesting assessment is presented concerning the relationship between values and interests in el-Sisi’s foreign policy in the two countries analyzed. Egyptian autocracy promotion has indeed almost always been ideological, both in Libya and in Tunisia, although interests have come into play in the second phase in Libya, when el-Sisi moderated his position and began the negotiations with the Tripoli government. Alla base di questo elaborato vi è un’analisi della promozione autocratica dell’Egitto di al-Sisi in Libia e Tunisia. A livello strutturale, il documento è diviso in tre parti: nella prima, la promozione dell’autocrazia egiziana viene analizzata a livello empirico in Libia e Tunisia. Per quanto riguarda la Libia, gli incentivi all’autocrazia hanno prevalso (addestramento delle forze armate e vendita di armi), anche se ci sono stati ricatti contro il maresciallo Haftar. Gli incentivi egiziani in Tunisia sono stati più deboli che in Libia: sono stati soprattutto diplomatici. Per questo è possibile affermare che c’è stata una forte emulazione di Saïed nei confronti di al-Sisi. Il documento passa poi a collocare i due casi all’interno della tipologia di Fossati (2022). Pertanto, è possibile giungere alla conclusione che la promozione dell’autocrazia egiziana in Libia è stata rigida fino al 2020, quando al-Sisi ha sostenuto solo Haftar, ma è diventata flessibile dopo il 2020, quando al-Sisi ha iniziato a negoziare con il governo di Tripoli. In entrambi i casi si tratta di relazioni di soft power. Come per la Tunisia, la promozione dell’autocrazia egiziana è flessibile con relazioni di soft power. Infine, viene presentata un’interessante valutazione del rapporto tra valori e interessi nella politica estera di al-Sisi nei due Paesi analizzati. La promozione dell’autocrazia egiziana è stata infatti quasi sempre ideologica, sia in Libia che in Tunisia, anche se gli interessi sono entrati in gioco nella seconda fase in Libia, quando al-Sisi ha moderato la sua posizione e ha iniziato i negoziati con il governo di Tripoli. Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2023-04-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/103 10.35305/rr.v3i6.103 Revista Euro latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP); Vol. 3 Núm. 6 (2023); 292 - 306 2683-7420 eng https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/103/169 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-205
container_title_str RELASP
language Inglés
format Artículo revista
topic Promozione dell’autocrazia
politica estera
Egitto
Medio Oriente
conflitti
Autocracy promotion
foreign policy
Egypt
Middle East
conflicts
spellingShingle Promozione dell’autocrazia
politica estera
Egitto
Medio Oriente
conflitti
Autocracy promotion
foreign policy
Egypt
Middle East
conflicts
Michelutto, Lisa
Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
topic_facet Promozione dell’autocrazia
politica estera
Egitto
Medio Oriente
conflitti
Autocracy promotion
foreign policy
Egypt
Middle East
conflicts
author Michelutto, Lisa
author_facet Michelutto, Lisa
author_sort Michelutto, Lisa
title Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
title_short Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
title_full Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
title_fullStr Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
title_full_unstemmed Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia
title_sort egyptian autocracy promotion in libya and tunisia
description TThe basis of this paper is an analysis of el-Sisi’s Egypt’s autocratic promotion of Libya and Tunisia. At the structural level, the paper is divided into three parts: in the first, Egyptian autocracy promotion is analyzed at the empirical level in Libya and Tunisia. As for Libya, rewards prevailed (training the armed forces and selling weapons), although there has been blackmail against Marshal Haftar. Egyptian rewards in Tunisia have been weaker than in Libya: they have been mainly diplomatic. That is why it is possible to affirm that there has been a strong emulation of Saïed towards el-Sisi. The paper then goes on to place the two cases within Fossati’s (2022) typology. Therefore, it is possible to come to the conclusion that Egyptian autocracy promotion in Libya was rigid until 2020, when el-Sisi only supported Haftar, but became flexible after 2020, when el-Sisi began to negotiate with the government in Tripoli. In both cases we have soft power relations. As for Tunisia, Egyptian autocracy promotion is flexible with soft power relations. Finally, an interesting assessment is presented concerning the relationship between values and interests in el-Sisi’s foreign policy in the two countries analyzed. Egyptian autocracy promotion has indeed almost always been ideological, both in Libya and in Tunisia, although interests have come into play in the second phase in Libya, when el-Sisi moderated his position and began the negotiations with the Tripoli government.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2023
url https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/103
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first_indexed 2023-05-11T18:46:08Z
last_indexed 2023-05-11T18:46:08Z
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