The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America

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Students of institutions have identified a pattern of ―serial replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin American countries in which institutional change has become frequent as well as radical. Patterns of serial replacement underlie wellknown ―traps‖ of deinstitutionalization: military coups beget...

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Autores principales: Pérez Liñán, Aníbal, Castagnola, Andrea
Formato: article artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: SeIDeSoC 2017
Materias:
Theory of Serial replacement
Judicial instability
Latin America
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356
http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356
Aporte de:
Repositorio Hipermedial de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario (UNR) de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R121-2133-10356
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-121
collection Repositorio Hipermedial de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario (UNR)
language Inglés
orig_language_str_mv eng
topic Theory of Serial replacement
Judicial instability
Latin America
spellingShingle Theory of Serial replacement
Judicial instability
Latin America
Pérez Liñán, Aníbal
Castagnola, Andrea
The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
topic_facet Theory of Serial replacement
Judicial instability
Latin America
description Students of institutions have identified a pattern of ―serial replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin American countries in which institutional change has become frequent as well as radical. Patterns of serial replacement underlie wellknown ―traps‖ of deinstitutionalization: military coups beget more coups, democratic breakdowns make breakdowns more likely, constitutional replacements encourage the adoption of new constitutions, inter-branch conflicts feed further conflicts, and so on. In this paper we develop a theory of serial replacement and apply it to explain cycles of judicial instability in 18 Latin American countries. Using a novel dataset covering more than 3,000 Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal justices between 1900 and 2010, we show that political attempts to reshuffle Supreme Courts and Constitutional Tribunals encourage new attempts to reshuffle the high courts in later years, creating a sequential pattern of judicial instability.
format article
artículo
publishedVersion
author Pérez Liñán, Aníbal
Castagnola, Andrea
author_facet Pérez Liñán, Aníbal
Castagnola, Andrea
author_sort Pérez Liñán, Aníbal
title The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
title_short The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
title_full The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
title_fullStr The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
title_sort legacies of judicial instability in latin america
publisher SeIDeSoC
publishDate 2017
url http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356
http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356
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AT castagnolaandrea thelegaciesofjudicialinstabilityinlatinamerica
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AT castagnolaandrea legaciesofjudicialinstabilityinlatinamerica
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