Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism

The article examines moral emotivism following two lines of argument. The first one considers its alleged support by the results of the cognitive sciences, showing that opposite interpretations of the same evidence are possible. The second one explores the second-person perspective in our ethical de...

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Autores principales: Larraín, Juan, Franck, Juan Francisco
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/5556
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record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
institution_str I-11
repository_str R-96
container_title_str Philosophia
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Emotivismo moral
Perspectiva de segunda persona
Racionalidad ética
Ciencias cognitivas
Moral emotivism
Second-person perspective
Ethical Rationality
Cognitive Science
spellingShingle Emotivismo moral
Perspectiva de segunda persona
Racionalidad ética
Ciencias cognitivas
Moral emotivism
Second-person perspective
Ethical Rationality
Cognitive Science
Larraín, Juan
Franck, Juan Francisco
Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
topic_facet Emotivismo moral
Perspectiva de segunda persona
Racionalidad ética
Ciencias cognitivas
Moral emotivism
Second-person perspective
Ethical Rationality
Cognitive Science
author Larraín, Juan
Franck, Juan Francisco
author_facet Larraín, Juan
Franck, Juan Francisco
author_sort Larraín, Juan
title Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
title_short Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
title_full Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
title_fullStr Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
title_full_unstemmed Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
title_sort second-person perspective and rationality in moral decisions. scientific evidence and the limites of emotivism
description The article examines moral emotivism following two lines of argument. The first one considers its alleged support by the results of the cognitive sciences, showing that opposite interpretations of the same evidence are possible. The second one explores the second-person perspective in our ethical decisions. From the analysis we can conclude the fundamental importance of rationality both for the recognition of the other person and for the formation of the ethical judgement. The paper concludes that, even though emotions are necessary, they are not sufficient for the formation of an ethical judgement, underlining that rationality is needed.
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
publishDate 2021
url https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/5556
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AT larrainjuan perspectivadesegundapersonayracionalidadenlasdecisionesmoralesevidenciacientificaylimitesdelemotivismo
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first_indexed 2022-06-20T13:34:32Z
last_indexed 2022-06-20T13:34:32Z
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