Suárez and the First Certainty of the Common Sense
The first certainty of common sense originally proves a multiplicity of things irreducible to each other. The unity of the ens is not an original empirical datum, but a derived concept, precisely because it is common to many things. From this point of view, it is necessary to distinguish between the...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4421 |
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| Sumario: | The first certainty of common sense originally proves a multiplicity of things irreducible to each other. The unity of the ens is not an original empirical datum, but a derived concept, precisely because it is common to many things. From this point of view, it is necessary to distinguish between the Suarezian philosophy and the Parmenidean philosophy. In particular, the way that the question concerning the dialectical opposition between being and nothing is approached in the Metaphysical Disputations cannot be interpreted as the manifestation of a Parmenidean position. The starting point of the Suarezian reflection is the plurality of the entities. |
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