The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue

The purpose of this paper is to expose and criticize Melissa Merritt’s interpretation of the concept of reflection in Kant’s philosophical work as presented in her book Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Specifically, it attempts to establish that her equalization between pure apperception and c-reflect...

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Autor principal: De Sasia, Laurentzi
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2020
Materias:
Kant
Merritt
apercepción
reflexión-c
apperception
reflection-c
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4418
Aporte de:
Philosophia de Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
id I11-R96article-4418
record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
institution_str I-11
repository_str R-96
container_title_str Philosophia
language Inglés
format Artículo revista
topic Kant
Merritt
apercepción
reflexión-c
Kant
Merritt
apperception
reflection-c
spellingShingle Kant
Merritt
apercepción
reflexión-c
Kant
Merritt
apperception
reflection-c
De Sasia, Laurentzi
The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
topic_facet Kant
Merritt
apercepción
reflexión-c
Kant
Merritt
apperception
reflection-c
author De Sasia, Laurentzi
author_facet De Sasia, Laurentzi
author_sort De Sasia, Laurentzi
title The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
title_short The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
title_full The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
title_fullStr The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
title_full_unstemmed The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue
title_sort problem of reflection-c as pure apperception in merritt’s kant on reflection and virtue
description The purpose of this paper is to expose and criticize Melissa Merritt’s interpretation of the concept of reflection in Kant’s philosophical work as presented in her book Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Specifically, it attempts to establish that her equalization between pure apperception and c-reflection is problematic. To achieve this, the paper exposes Merritt’s notions of reflection and compares them with the notion of pure apperception in Kant’s first Critique to show how pure apperception cannot be identified with c-reflection as it is characterized by her.
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
publishDate 2020
url https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4418
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AT desasialaurentzi problemofreflectioncaspureapperceptioninmerrittskantonreflectionandvirtue
first_indexed 2022-06-20T13:34:27Z
last_indexed 2022-06-20T13:34:27Z
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