The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman

In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by me...

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Autor principal: Cormick, Claudio
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2019
Materias:
Goldman
Williams
internismo
externismo
racionalidad
internalism
externalism
rationality
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116
Aporte de:
Philosophia de Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
id I11-R96article-2116
record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
institution_str I-11
repository_str R-96
container_title_str Philosophia
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Goldman
Williams
internismo
externismo
racionalidad
Goldman
Williams
internalism
externalism
rationality
spellingShingle Goldman
Williams
internismo
externismo
racionalidad
Goldman
Williams
internalism
externalism
rationality
Cormick, Claudio
The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
topic_facet Goldman
Williams
internismo
externismo
racionalidad
Goldman
Williams
internalism
externalism
rationality
author Cormick, Claudio
author_facet Cormick, Claudio
author_sort Cormick, Claudio
title The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
title_short The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
title_full The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
title_fullStr The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
title_full_unstemmed The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman
title_sort problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. an intervention in relation to the debate between williams and goldman
description In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by means of pointing out that, whereas a series of authors (in particular, Laurence BonJour and, after his tracks, Jennifer Lackey and Fernando Broncano) extract from the internalism/externalism debate the "dualistic" consequence according to which knowledge cannot be analysed from only one perspective, but there exist at least two"”that of subjective rationality and that of conduciveness to truth"”, Goldman appears on the contrary as a "hard line" externalist for whom internalism is simply untenable and thus epistemic justification is to be understood exclusively in reliabilist terms. Against this background, we will analyse Williams’ proposal. On the one hand, this author attempts to prove that Goldman’s criticisms of internalism are limited to only a "mentalistic" or "subjectivistic" version of it. On the other hand, he seeks to vindicate a moderate internalist epistemology by relying on the tenet that human knowledge is indissociably linked to considerations of accountability. We will try to show that Goldman’s reply, which is focused on denouncing an alleged confusion by Williams between the problem of "justifiedness" and the problem of "justification", does not do justice to the real scope of the question of epistemic justification, once this question is analysed, not on the basis of alleged "intuitions" about the meaning of "knowledge" in ordinary language, but on the basis of practices in which such notions can operate.
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
publishDate 2019
url https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116
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