Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child

Empirical evidence suggests that human beings develop the capacity to ascribe mental states (as false beliefs) at the age of four or five years old. This has been demonstrated through the use of different tests (appearance – reality, representational change and false belief tests). Three year old in...

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Autor principal: Duero, Dante Gabriel
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2010
Materias:
falsa creencia
metarrepresentación
función ejecutiva
adscripción mental
false belief
metarepresentation
executive function
mental attribution
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265
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Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R363-article-5265
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R363-article-52652024-09-03T22:30:27Z Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child Reconocimiento y adscripción de creencias en el niño. Un estudio empírico sobre algunos factores inespecíficos presuntamente asociados Duero, Dante Gabriel falsa creencia metarrepresentación función ejecutiva adscripción mental false belief metarepresentation executive function mental attribution Empirical evidence suggests that human beings develop the capacity to ascribe mental states (as false beliefs) at the age of four or five years old. This has been demonstrated through the use of different tests (appearance – reality, representational change and false belief tests). Three year old infants commit serious mistakes in such tests. Perner (1994; 1995) suggests that such capacities depend on the metacognitive skills that permits the comprehension of the mind as a representational structure. But its are not developed until the age of four or five. Leslie (1987; 1988; 1994b) sustains that such capacity depends on the ontogenetic development of a “paraintentional” modular structure in the brain. Leslie think that around the second year of life children express “mentalist” abilities. For Leslie, lack of executives capacities and lack of a mechanism responsible for coordination of inferences explain the difficulties of children in false belief tests. The objective of this work is to inquire why 3 years old children can not attribute false beliefs, in “false belief test”. The data shows that children are capable of solving problems that require mental adscription at 3 years old, as long as problems are simplified. This indicates that the reported low performance of 3 year old children can be explained in terms of general skills to compute information. Evidencia empírica sugiere que el ser humano desarrolla, durante la edad preescolar, competencias para adscribir estados mentales como creencias, a otras personas. Esto ha sido demostrado empleando diferentes pruebas (las pruebas: de apariencia realidad, de cambio representacional y de falsa creencia). Los niños de tres años presentan serios inconvenientes para resolver estos test. Perner (1994; 1995) sugiere que estas capacidades dependen del desarrollo de habilidades metacognitivas que permiten entender la mente desde una estructura representacional. Tales competencias no se desarrollarían hasta los cuatro o cinco años. En oposición, Leslie (1987; 1988; 1994b) sostiene que estas habilidades dependen del desarrollo de un mecanismo paraintencional modular, activado en nuestro cerebro hacia la edad de dos años y medio o tres años. Para Leslie, sería una falla de tipo ejecutivo y el insuficiente desarrollo de un mecanismo cognitivo que ayuda coordinar inferencias, lo que explicaría estas deficiencias en test como el de la falsa creencia. En el siguiente trabajo nos hemos propuesto analizar los factores responsables del desarrollo de competencias para la atribución mental. Nuestros datos sugieren que hacia los 3 años, los niños son capaces de resolver problemas que requieren de adscripción mental. Los problemas de los niños pequeños para atribuir estados mentales, reportados por otros estudios, podrían ser explicados en términos de competencias generales para procesar información. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2010-02-20 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf application/msword application/msword https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265 10.32348/1852.4206.v2.n1.5265 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 2, No 1 (2010): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; 1-13 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 2, No 1 (2010): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; 1-13 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v2.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265/5428 https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265/17-48-1-SM.doc https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265/24796 Derechos de autor 2010 Dante Gabriel Duero
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-363
container_title_str Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic falsa creencia
metarrepresentación
función ejecutiva
adscripción mental
false belief
metarepresentation
executive function
mental attribution
spellingShingle falsa creencia
metarrepresentación
función ejecutiva
adscripción mental
false belief
metarepresentation
executive function
mental attribution
Duero, Dante Gabriel
Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
topic_facet falsa creencia
metarrepresentación
función ejecutiva
adscripción mental
false belief
metarepresentation
executive function
mental attribution
author Duero, Dante Gabriel
author_facet Duero, Dante Gabriel
author_sort Duero, Dante Gabriel
title Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
title_short Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
title_full Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
title_fullStr Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
title_full_unstemmed Recognition and Ascription of Beliefs in the child
title_sort recognition and ascription of beliefs in the child
description Empirical evidence suggests that human beings develop the capacity to ascribe mental states (as false beliefs) at the age of four or five years old. This has been demonstrated through the use of different tests (appearance – reality, representational change and false belief tests). Three year old infants commit serious mistakes in such tests. Perner (1994; 1995) suggests that such capacities depend on the metacognitive skills that permits the comprehension of the mind as a representational structure. But its are not developed until the age of four or five. Leslie (1987; 1988; 1994b) sustains that such capacity depends on the ontogenetic development of a “paraintentional” modular structure in the brain. Leslie think that around the second year of life children express “mentalist” abilities. For Leslie, lack of executives capacities and lack of a mechanism responsible for coordination of inferences explain the difficulties of children in false belief tests. The objective of this work is to inquire why 3 years old children can not attribute false beliefs, in “false belief test”. The data shows that children are capable of solving problems that require mental adscription at 3 years old, as long as problems are simplified. This indicates that the reported low performance of 3 year old children can be explained in terms of general skills to compute information.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2010
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5265
work_keys_str_mv AT duerodantegabriel recognitionandascriptionofbeliefsinthechild
AT duerodantegabriel reconocimientoyadscripciondecreenciasenelninounestudioempiricosobrealgunosfactoresinespecificospresuntamenteasociados
first_indexed 2024-09-03T22:31:59Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T22:31:59Z
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