Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence
In this paper I reject the possibility that animal reasoning, negation in particular, necessarily involves the representation of Absence, as suggested by José Luis Bermúdez, since this would still work as a logical negation (unavailable for non-linguistic creatures). False belief, pretense, and comm...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5231 |
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I10-R363-article-52312019-05-15T15:36:36Z Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence Razonamiento animal: Negación y representaciones de ausencia Morales Ladrón de Guevara, Jorge animales no-humanos criaturas no-lingüísticas racionalidad psicología comparativa etología cognitiva Bermúdez non-human animals non-linguistic creatures rationality comparative psychology cognitive ethology Bermúdez In this paper I reject the possibility that animal reasoning, negation in particular, necessarily involves the representation of Absence, as suggested by José Luis Bermúdez, since this would still work as a logical negation (unavailable for non-linguistic creatures). False belief, pretense, and communication experiments show that non-human animals (at least some primates) have difficulties representing absent entities or properties. I offer an alternative account resorting to the sub-symbolic similarity judgments proposed by Vigo & Allen and I introduce the notion of expectation: animal proto-negation takes place through the incompatibility between an expected and the actual representation. Finally, I propose that the paradigm of expectations can be extrapolated to other experiments in cognitive psychology (both with pre-linguistic children and animals) in order to design ?fair? experiments which test other minds considering their true abilities. En este trabajo rechazo la posibilidad de que el razonamiento animal, en particular la negación, involucre necesariamente la representación de Ausencia, como sugiere José Luis Bermúdez, pues ésta operaría como una negación lógica (no disponible para criaturas no lingüísticas). Experimentos de creencias falsas, fingimiento y comunicación muestran que animales no humanos (al menos ciertos primates) tienen dificultades para representar entidades o propiedades ausentes. Ofrezco una explicación alternativa recurriendo a los juicios sub-simbólicos de semejanza propuestos por Vigo & Allen e introduzco la noción de expectativa: la negación se da a través de la incompatibilidad entre una representación esperada y la actual. Finalmente, sostengo que el paradigma de expectativas puede ser extrapolado a otros experimentos en psicología cognitiva (tanto con niños prelingüísticos como con animales) para diseñar experimentos "justos" que examinen otras mentes considerando sus habilidades reales. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011-05-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion filosofía; psicología comparativa; etología cognitiva application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5231 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5231 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"; 20-33 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"; 20-33 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5231/5396 Derechos de autor 2011 Jorge Morales Ladrón de Guevara |
| institution |
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
| institution_str |
I-10 |
| repository_str |
R-363 |
| container_title_str |
Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| topic |
animales no-humanos criaturas no-lingüísticas racionalidad psicología comparativa etología cognitiva Bermúdez non-human animals non-linguistic creatures rationality comparative psychology cognitive ethology Bermúdez |
| spellingShingle |
animales no-humanos criaturas no-lingüísticas racionalidad psicología comparativa etología cognitiva Bermúdez non-human animals non-linguistic creatures rationality comparative psychology cognitive ethology Bermúdez Morales Ladrón de Guevara, Jorge Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| topic_facet |
animales no-humanos criaturas no-lingüísticas racionalidad psicología comparativa etología cognitiva Bermúdez non-human animals non-linguistic creatures rationality comparative psychology cognitive ethology Bermúdez |
| author |
Morales Ladrón de Guevara, Jorge |
| author_facet |
Morales Ladrón de Guevara, Jorge |
| author_sort |
Morales Ladrón de Guevara, Jorge |
| title |
Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| title_short |
Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| title_full |
Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| title_fullStr |
Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| title_sort |
animal reasoning: negation and representations of absence |
| description |
In this paper I reject the possibility that animal reasoning, negation in particular, necessarily involves the representation of Absence, as suggested by José Luis Bermúdez, since this would still work as a logical negation (unavailable for non-linguistic creatures). False belief, pretense, and communication experiments show that non-human animals (at least some primates) have difficulties representing absent entities or properties. I offer an alternative account resorting to the sub-symbolic similarity judgments proposed by Vigo & Allen and I introduce the notion of expectation: animal proto-negation takes place through the incompatibility between an expected and the actual representation. Finally, I propose that the paradigm of expectations can be extrapolated to other experiments in cognitive psychology (both with pre-linguistic children and animals) in order to design ?fair? experiments which test other minds considering their true abilities. |
| publisher |
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5231 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT moralesladrondeguevarajorge animalreasoningnegationandrepresentationsofabsence AT moralesladrondeguevarajorge razonamientoanimalnegacionyrepresentacionesdeausencia |
| first_indexed |
2024-09-03T22:31:54Z |
| last_indexed |
2024-09-03T22:31:54Z |
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1809215876976607232 |