Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective
In the field of the Executive-Legislative Power relations, the issue of party discipline is a focus of great interest. In the case of Argentina, 2001 formalized a crisis of representativeness that has its correlate in Legislative Power. In this sense, especially in Argentina, lately, the study of th...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC)
2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/30938 |
| Aporte de: |
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I10-R357-article-30938 |
|---|---|
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ojs |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
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I-10 |
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R-357 |
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Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS) |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| topic |
Kirchner Macri Governors Executive- Legislative Legislative politics Kirchner Macri Gobernadores Ejecutivo- Legislativo Política legislativa |
| spellingShingle |
Kirchner Macri Governors Executive- Legislative Legislative politics Kirchner Macri Gobernadores Ejecutivo- Legislativo Política legislativa Zamichiei, Bernardo Coronel, Alejandro Aníbal Gutiérrez Guerra, Bautista Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| topic_facet |
Kirchner Macri Governors Executive- Legislative Legislative politics Kirchner Macri Gobernadores Ejecutivo- Legislativo Política legislativa |
| author |
Zamichiei, Bernardo Coronel, Alejandro Aníbal Gutiérrez Guerra, Bautista |
| author_facet |
Zamichiei, Bernardo Coronel, Alejandro Aníbal Gutiérrez Guerra, Bautista |
| author_sort |
Zamichiei, Bernardo |
| title |
Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| title_short |
Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| title_full |
Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| title_fullStr |
Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| title_sort |
governors and party discipline at the national congress: cristina kirchner and mauricio macri administrations in comparative perspective |
| description |
In the field of the Executive-Legislative Power relations, the issue of party discipline is a focus of great interest. In the case of Argentina, 2001 formalized a crisis of representativeness that has its correlate in Legislative Power. In this sense, especially in Argentina, lately, the study of the role of a previously silenced actor was installed in the specialists’ agenda: the Governor.
The controversial and failed initiative to transform Resolution 125 into law, back in 2008, when despite having a majority in both Chambers the project was rejected, showed that the indiscipline of some governors had its correlation in the both of both ruling, allied and opponent legislators, thus starting a time series that comes to present day, going through three presidential periods.
All this raises new and interesting questions: Has the disciplinary behavior of governors under Cristina Kichner’s leadership been different from that of Mauricio Macri? Does legislative party discipline vary depending on whether the ruling party has parliamentary majority or not? How disciplined are the ruling party deputies and senators and how much opponents? How disciplined is Peronism/Kirchnerism (and all its neologies) when it is in power? And more intriguing: How disciplined is when they are not in power?
The following article aims to answer these questions using roll-call votes of those projects where the governors’ position could be rescued for the period 2007-2019, using the Independence-Territoriality (IT) Index (Coronel & Zamichiei, 2012.)
The results allow us to reinforce some hypothesis and dismiss other claims in existing literature about the role of governor and the legislators in party discipline, while showing the similarities and differences occurred during the presidencies of Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri. |
| publisher |
Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC) |
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2020 |
| url |
https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/30938 |
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I10-R357-article-309382022-07-05T03:29:44Z Governors and party discipline at the National Congress: Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri administrations in comparative perspective Gobernadores y disciplina partidaria en el Congreso Nacional: los gobiernos de Cristina Kirchner y Mauricio Macri en perspectiva comparada Zamichiei, Bernardo Coronel, Alejandro Aníbal Gutiérrez Guerra, Bautista Kirchner Macri Governors Executive- Legislative Legislative politics Kirchner Macri Gobernadores Ejecutivo- Legislativo Política legislativa In the field of the Executive-Legislative Power relations, the issue of party discipline is a focus of great interest. In the case of Argentina, 2001 formalized a crisis of representativeness that has its correlate in Legislative Power. In this sense, especially in Argentina, lately, the study of the role of a previously silenced actor was installed in the specialists’ agenda: the Governor. The controversial and failed initiative to transform Resolution 125 into law, back in 2008, when despite having a majority in both Chambers the project was rejected, showed that the indiscipline of some governors had its correlation in the both of both ruling, allied and opponent legislators, thus starting a time series that comes to present day, going through three presidential periods. All this raises new and interesting questions: Has the disciplinary behavior of governors under Cristina Kichner’s leadership been different from that of Mauricio Macri? Does legislative party discipline vary depending on whether the ruling party has parliamentary majority or not? How disciplined are the ruling party deputies and senators and how much opponents? How disciplined is Peronism/Kirchnerism (and all its neologies) when it is in power? And more intriguing: How disciplined is when they are not in power? The following article aims to answer these questions using roll-call votes of those projects where the governors’ position could be rescued for the period 2007-2019, using the Independence-Territoriality (IT) Index (Coronel & Zamichiei, 2012.) The results allow us to reinforce some hypothesis and dismiss other claims in existing literature about the role of governor and the legislators in party discipline, while showing the similarities and differences occurred during the presidencies of Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri. En el campo de las relaciones Poder Ejecutivo-Poder Legislativo, el tema de la disciplina partidaria constituye un foco de gran interés para la literatura disciplinar. Para el caso puntual de la Argentina, el año 2001 formalizó una crisis de representatividad de los partidos políticos que tiene su correlato en el Poder Legislativo. En este sentido, especialmente en la Argentina, últimamente se instaló en la agenda de los especialistas el estudio sobre el rol de un actor hasta entonces silenciado: el gobernador. La polémica y fallida iniciativa de transformar en Ley a la Resolución 125 en 2008, cuando a pesar de contar con mayoría en ambas Cámaras la propuesta fuera rechazada, mostró que la indisciplina de los gobernadores tuvo su correlato en el voto tanto oficialista como aliado y opositor, dando así comienzo a una serie temporal que llega hasta el presente, pasando por tres períodos presidenciales completos. Todo esto genera nuevos e interesantes interrogantes: ¿ha sido distinto el comportamiento disciplinador de los gobernadores bajo del liderazgo de Cristina Kirchner respecto al de Mauricio Macri? ¿Varía la disciplina partidaria legislativa según el oficialismo tenga o no mayoría propia? ¿Qué tan disciplinados son los diputados y los senadores oficialistas y opositores? ¿Cuán disciplinado es el peronismo/kirchnerismo en el poder y cuando no lo está? El siguiente trabajo tiene por finalidad responder a estos interrogantes utilizando las votaciones nominales de aquellos proyectos en donde la postura de los gobernadores pudo rescatarse para el período 2007-2019, utilizando para ello el Índice IT de Independencia-Territorialidad (Coronel & Zamichiei, 2012). Los resultados obtenidos permiten reforzar algunas hipótesis y descartar otras afirmaciones de la literatura existente acerca del rol del gobernador y los legisladores en la disciplina partidaria, al tiempo que muestra las similitudes y diferencias ejercidas durante las presidencias de Cristina Kirchner y Mauricio Macri. Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC) 2020-12-18 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/30938 Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS); Núm. 10 (2020): Julio - Diciembre ; 98-139 2524-9568 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/30938/32235 https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/30938/32236 Derechos de autor 2020 Bernardo Zamichiei, Alejandro Aníbal Coronel, Bautista Gutiérrez Guerra http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |