Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner

The article addresses congressional political control over the Executive from a political perspective with empirical anchoring, which does not focus on the mechanisms by which the Executive is accountable to the Congress, but on the Congress itself. By taking the Chamber of Deputies’ interpellations...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Cingolani, Mónica
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC) 2019
Materias:
Legislative control
Congressional oversight
Parliamentary accountability
Political parties
Argentina
Control político
Congreso
Diputados
Interpelaciones
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450
Aporte de:
Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS) de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

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