Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner

The article addresses congressional political control over the Executive from a political perspective with empirical anchoring, which does not focus on the mechanisms by which the Executive is accountable to the Congress, but on the Congress itself. By taking the Chamber of Deputies’ interpellations...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Cingolani, Mónica
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC) 2019
Materias:
Legislative control
Congressional oversight
Parliamentary accountability
Political parties
Argentina
Control político
Congreso
Diputados
Interpelaciones
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450
Aporte de:
Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS) de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R357-article-26450
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R357-article-264502021-09-29T17:23:22Z Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner El Control político del Ejecutivo en Argentina.: Los incentivos y la práctica del control por interpelaciones, de Menem a Fernández de Kirchner. Cingolani, Mónica Legislative control Congressional oversight Parliamentary accountability Political parties Argentina Control político Congreso Argentina Diputados Interpelaciones The article addresses congressional political control over the Executive from a political perspective with empirical anchoring, which does not focus on the mechanisms by which the Executive is accountable to the Congress, but on the Congress itself. By taking the Chamber of Deputies’ interpellations as a reference, and comparing presidencies and political bloc structures for almost two decades (1994-2011), an empirical-analytical study is conducted, which unravels the structure of political and institutional incentives intended to encourage or obstruct the exercise of congressional political control. It is confirmed that the Argentine Congress is sometimes active, but always ineffective (technological restrictions arisingfrom institutional design) in terms ofcontrol. At the same time, it may be concluded that parliamentary scenarios more akin to control are those where competitive and slightly fragmented parties encourage opposition minorities to take control actions. The article contributes to political science debate and conceptual discussion about the potential of congressional political control in presidential democracies, while providing evidence on the control activities conducted in a particular system. El artículo se ocupa del control político congresual sobre el Poder Ejecutivo desde un enfoque politológico y con un anclaje empírico, que no focaliza en la vía de la rendición de cuentas del Ejecutivo ante el Congreso, sino que hace foco en el Congreso mismo. Tomando como referencia las interpelaciones de la Cámara de Diputados, y comparando presidencias y composición de bloques políticos durante casi dos décadas (1994 a 2011) realiza un estudio empírico-analítico que desentraña la estructura de incentivos políticos e institucionales que opera para promover u obturar el ejercicio del control politico congresual. Se confirma que el Congreso argentino a veces es activo, pero siempre inefectivo (restricciones tecnológicas provenientes del diseño institucional) en materia de control. Paralelamente, se comprueba que los escenarios parlamentarios más afines al control son los de partidos competitivos y poco fragmentados que alientan a las minorías de oposición a iniciar acciones de control. El artículo suma aportes al debate politológico y discusión conceptual alrededor de las posibilidades del control político congresual en las democracias presidencialistas, a la vez que aporta evidencias sobre la actividad de control en un sistema concreto. Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC) 2019-12-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450 Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS); Núm. 8 (2019): Julio - Diciembre; 18-59 2524-9568 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450/28502 https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450/28504 Derechos de autor 2019 Mónica Cingolani http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-357
container_title_str Administración Pública y Sociedad (APyS)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Legislative control
Congressional oversight
Parliamentary accountability
Political parties
Argentina
Control político
Congreso
Argentina
Diputados
Interpelaciones
spellingShingle Legislative control
Congressional oversight
Parliamentary accountability
Political parties
Argentina
Control político
Congreso
Argentina
Diputados
Interpelaciones
Cingolani, Mónica
Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
topic_facet Legislative control
Congressional oversight
Parliamentary accountability
Political parties
Argentina
Control político
Congreso
Argentina
Diputados
Interpelaciones
author Cingolani, Mónica
author_facet Cingolani, Mónica
author_sort Cingolani, Mónica
title Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
title_short Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
title_full Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
title_fullStr Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
title_full_unstemmed Political control over the executive in Argentina: Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner
title_sort political control over the executive in argentina: incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from menem to fernández de kirchner
description The article addresses congressional political control over the Executive from a political perspective with empirical anchoring, which does not focus on the mechanisms by which the Executive is accountable to the Congress, but on the Congress itself. By taking the Chamber of Deputies’ interpellations as a reference, and comparing presidencies and political bloc structures for almost two decades (1994-2011), an empirical-analytical study is conducted, which unravels the structure of political and institutional incentives intended to encourage or obstruct the exercise of congressional political control. It is confirmed that the Argentine Congress is sometimes active, but always ineffective (technological restrictions arisingfrom institutional design) in terms ofcontrol. At the same time, it may be concluded that parliamentary scenarios more akin to control are those where competitive and slightly fragmented parties encourage opposition minorities to take control actions. The article contributes to political science debate and conceptual discussion about the potential of congressional political control in presidential democracies, while providing evidence on the control activities conducted in a particular system.
publisher Instituto de Investigación y Formación en Administración Pública (IIFAP-FCS-UNC)
publishDate 2019
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/26450
work_keys_str_mv AT cingolanimonica politicalcontrolovertheexecutiveinargentinaincentivesandthepracticeofinterpellationcontrolfrommenemtofernandezdekirchner
AT cingolanimonica elcontrolpoliticodelejecutivoenargentinalosincentivosylapracticadelcontrolporinterpelacionesdemenemafernandezdekirchner
first_indexed 2024-09-03T22:22:15Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T22:22:15Z
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