ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM

First, I offer a reconstruction of Waldron’s normative positivism as he defended it mainly in “Normative (or Ethical) Positivism” (2001) and “Law and  Disagreement” (1999) but also later in his response to Marmor in 2014. Second, Ipresent some arguments addressed to defy his conception of law and de...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Iosa, Juan
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Derecho 2023
Materias:
Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Positivismo Normativo
Positivismo Ético
Normative Positivism
Ethical Positivism
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/43030
Aporte de:
Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R353-article-43030
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R353-article-430302024-07-02T17:57:33Z ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM SOBRE EL POSITIVISMO NORMATIVO DE WALDRON Iosa, Juan Jeremy Waldron Fernando Atria Positivismo Normativo Positivismo Ético Jeremy Waldron Fernando Atria Normative Positivism Ethical Positivism First, I offer a reconstruction of Waldron’s normative positivism as he defended it mainly in “Normative (or Ethical) Positivism” (2001) and “Law and  Disagreement” (1999) but also later in his response to Marmor in 2014. Second, Ipresent some arguments addressed to defy his conception of law and democracy: it can`t give us a proper descriptive account of the law at the retail level (here its claims could only be normative, which is not enough for a theory of law). And it gives us a strictly procedural conception of  democratic legitimacy which can’t account of procedurally fair but nonetheless illegitimates democracies in function of the level of injustice of the circumstances or the level of alienation of the society where the procedure works. Regarding this last issue, I will rest on some ideas from Atria’s “La Forma del Derecho”. Resumen: Primero, ofrezco una reconstrucción del positivismo normativo de Waldron tal como él lo defendiera principalmente en “Positivismo normativo (o ético)” (2001) y “Derecho y desacuerdo” (1999), pero también más adelante en su respuesta a Marmor en 2014. En segundo lugar, presento algunos argumentos dirigidos a desafiar su concepción del derecho y la democracia: no nos ofrece una descripción adecuada del derecho al por menor (aquí sus afirmaciones solo podrían ser normativas, lo cual no es suficiente para una teoría del derecho). Y nos da una concepción estrictamente procesal de la legitimidad democrática que no puede dar cuenta de las democracias procesalmente justas, pero sin embargo ilegítimas en función del nivel de injusticia de las circunstancias o el nivel de alienación de la sociedad donde funciona el procedimiento. Para el análisis de esta última cuestión me apoyaré en algunas ideas de “La Forma del Derecho” de Fernando Atria. Facultad de Derecho 2023-11-14 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/43030 10.31054/2314.3061.v12.n2.43030 Revista de la Facultad de Derecho; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): NUEVA SERIE II; 147-158 2314-3061 1850-9371 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/43030/43015 Derechos de autor 2023 Facultad de Derecho. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-353
container_title_str Revista de la Facultad de Derecho
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Positivismo Normativo
Positivismo Ético
Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Normative Positivism
Ethical Positivism
spellingShingle Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Positivismo Normativo
Positivismo Ético
Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Normative Positivism
Ethical Positivism
Iosa, Juan
ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
topic_facet Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Positivismo Normativo
Positivismo Ético
Jeremy Waldron
Fernando Atria
Normative Positivism
Ethical Positivism
author Iosa, Juan
author_facet Iosa, Juan
author_sort Iosa, Juan
title ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
title_short ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
title_full ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
title_fullStr ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
title_full_unstemmed ON WALDRON’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM
title_sort on waldron’s normative positivism
description First, I offer a reconstruction of Waldron’s normative positivism as he defended it mainly in “Normative (or Ethical) Positivism” (2001) and “Law and  Disagreement” (1999) but also later in his response to Marmor in 2014. Second, Ipresent some arguments addressed to defy his conception of law and democracy: it can`t give us a proper descriptive account of the law at the retail level (here its claims could only be normative, which is not enough for a theory of law). And it gives us a strictly procedural conception of  democratic legitimacy which can’t account of procedurally fair but nonetheless illegitimates democracies in function of the level of injustice of the circumstances or the level of alienation of the society where the procedure works. Regarding this last issue, I will rest on some ideas from Atria’s “La Forma del Derecho”.
publisher Facultad de Derecho
publishDate 2023
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/43030
work_keys_str_mv AT iosajuan onwaldronsnormativepositivism
AT iosajuan sobreelpositivismonormativodewaldron
first_indexed 2024-09-03T22:18:59Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T22:18:59Z
_version_ 1809215064141463552

Ejemplares similares