ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION
I will unfold in this work the consequences that for constitutional law has the assumption of a thesis that not for well-known has been less ignored, less taken into account in the doctrinal production, in the theoretical work of many of our constitutionalists. Sustained long ago by Ronald Dworkin,...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Derecho
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/27882 |
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I10-R353-article-27882 |
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I10-R353-article-278822020-03-10T16:37:52Z ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION SOBRE LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE UNA DOGMÁTICA CONSTITUCIONAL EL CASO DEL ARTÍCULO 19 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL ARGENTINA Iosa, Juan Legal science Constitutional legal science Ronald Dworkin Moral reading of the Constitution Article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution Dogmática jurídica Dogmática constitucional Ronald Dworkin Lectura moral de la Constitución Artículo 19 de la Constitución Nacional Argentina I will unfold in this work the consequences that for constitutional law has the assumption of a thesis that not for well-known has been less ignored, less taken into account in the doctrinal production, in the theoretical work of many of our constitutionalists. Sustained long ago by Ronald Dworkin, the thesis affirms that the constitutional clauses that establish rights and guarantees cannot be interpreted but appealing to our moral beliefs, specifically to our beliefs about what is the moral point of the law as a practice in general and of the particular institution that we are dealing with. It follows, in my opinion, that there can be no "legal science" in the classical sense, ie. description of the semantic content of legal texts, when the text in question is the Constitution. Appealing to the problem of what is the correct interpretation of article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution, I will briefly present the scheme of work that I believe should be applied when we are dealing with constitutional cases. Desarrollaré en este trabajo las consecuencias que para el derecho constitucional tiene la asunción de una tesis que no por conocida ha sido menos ignorada, menos tenida en cuenta en la producción doctrinaria, en el quehacer teórico de muchos de nuestros constitucionalistas. Sostenida hace ya tiempo por Ronald Dworkin, la tesis afirma que las cláusulas constitucionales que establecen derechos y garantías no pueden ser interpretadas sino apelando a nuestras creencias morales, específicamente a nuestras creencias sobre cuál es el punto moral del derecho como práctica en general y de la institución en particular que estemos tratando. De aquí se sigue, a mi juicio, que no puede haber "dogmática jurídica" en sentido clásico, ie. descripción del contenido semántico de los textos jurídicos, cuando el texto en cuestión es la Constitución. Apelando al problema de cuál sea la correcta interpretación del artículo 19 de la Constitución Nacional Argentina presentaré escuetamente el esquema de trabajo que considero debe aplicarse cuando estamos frente a casos constitucionales. Facultad de Derecho 2019-11-29 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/27882 Revista de la Facultad de Derecho; Vol. 10 Núm. 2 (2019): NUEVA SERIE II; 122-135 2314-3061 1850-9371 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/27882/29170 |
| institution |
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
| institution_str |
I-10 |
| repository_str |
R-353 |
| container_title_str |
Revista de la Facultad de Derecho |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| topic |
Legal science Constitutional legal science Ronald Dworkin Moral reading of the Constitution Article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution Dogmática jurídica Dogmática constitucional Ronald Dworkin Lectura moral de la Constitución Artículo 19 de la Constitución Nacional Argentina |
| spellingShingle |
Legal science Constitutional legal science Ronald Dworkin Moral reading of the Constitution Article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution Dogmática jurídica Dogmática constitucional Ronald Dworkin Lectura moral de la Constitución Artículo 19 de la Constitución Nacional Argentina Iosa, Juan ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| topic_facet |
Legal science Constitutional legal science Ronald Dworkin Moral reading of the Constitution Article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution Dogmática jurídica Dogmática constitucional Ronald Dworkin Lectura moral de la Constitución Artículo 19 de la Constitución Nacional Argentina |
| author |
Iosa, Juan |
| author_facet |
Iosa, Juan |
| author_sort |
Iosa, Juan |
| title |
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| title_short |
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| title_full |
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| title_fullStr |
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| title_full_unstemmed |
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION |
| title_sort |
on the impossibility of a constitutional legal science the case of article 19 of argentinean national constitution |
| description |
I will unfold in this work the consequences that for constitutional law has the assumption of a thesis that not for well-known has been less ignored, less taken into account in the doctrinal production, in the theoretical work of many of our constitutionalists. Sustained long ago by Ronald Dworkin, the thesis affirms that the constitutional clauses that establish rights and guarantees cannot be interpreted but appealing to our moral beliefs, specifically to our beliefs about what is the moral point of the law as a practice in general and of the particular institution that we are dealing with. It follows, in my opinion, that there can be no "legal science" in the classical sense, ie. description of the semantic content of legal texts, when the text in question is the Constitution. Appealing to the problem of what is the correct interpretation of article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution, I will briefly present the scheme of work that I believe should be applied when we are dealing with constitutional cases. |
| publisher |
Facultad de Derecho |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/27882 |
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2024-09-03T22:18:18Z |
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