Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition
To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human developmen...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/34427 |
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I10-R341-article-34427 |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
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R-341 |
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Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia |
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Español |
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Artículo revista |
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Psicología moral Evolución de la moralidad Cognición animal Psicología folk Moral psychology Evolution of morality Animal Cognition Folk psychology |
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Psicología moral Evolución de la moralidad Cognición animal Psicología folk Moral psychology Evolution of morality Animal Cognition Folk psychology Andrews, Kristin Regues (Trad.), Juana Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
| topic_facet |
Psicología moral Evolución de la moralidad Cognición animal Psicología folk Moral psychology Evolution of morality Animal Cognition Folk psychology |
| author |
Andrews, Kristin Regues (Trad.), Juana |
| author_facet |
Andrews, Kristin Regues (Trad.), Juana |
| author_sort |
Andrews, Kristin |
| title |
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
| title_short |
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
| title_full |
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
| title_fullStr |
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition |
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naïve normativity: the social foundation of moral cognition |
| description |
To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri’s account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: (1) the ability to identify agents, (2) sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, (3) the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and (4) responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and nave normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique.
Originally published as: Andrews, K. (2020). Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(1), 36-56. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.30 |
| publisher |
Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades |
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2021 |
| url |
https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/34427 |
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I10-R341-article-344272025-01-01T15:10:41Z Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition Normatividad ingenua: El fundamento social de la cognición moral Andrews, Kristin Regues (Trad.), Juana Psicología moral Evolución de la moralidad Cognición animal Psicología folk Moral psychology Evolution of morality Animal Cognition Folk psychology To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri’s account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: (1) the ability to identify agents, (2) sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, (3) the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and (4) responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and nave normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique. Originally published as: Andrews, K. (2020). Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(1), 36-56. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.30 Para responder algunas preguntas atractivas, tales como si los animales son criaturas morales o cómo ha evolucionado la moral, propongo comenzar con una pregunta algo menos complicada: ¿poseen los animales cognición normativa? Las investigaciones recientes en psicología sugieren que el pensamiento normativo, o pensamiento deóntico (ought-thought), comienza temprano en el desarrollo humano. Las investigaciones recientes en filosofía sugieren que la psicología ordinaria se encuentra basada en el pensamiento normativo. Investigaciones recientes en primatología aportan evidencia de capacidades sofisticadas de aprendizaje cultural y social en grandes simios. Basándome en estas tres literaturas, sostengo que la variedad humana de cognición social y cognición moral abarca las mismas capacidades cognitivas y que los grandes simios también pueden ser criaturas normativas. Para argumentar esto, desarrollo una explicación de las normas sociales animales que comparte propiedades fundamentales con la explicación de Cristina Bicchieri sobre las normas sociales, pero que reduce los requerimientos cognitivos para poseer una norma social. Propongo un conjunto de cuatro pre-requisitos de desarrollo temprano implicados en la cognición social que constituyen lo que denomino normatividad ingenua: (1) la habilidad para identificar agentes, (2) la sensibilidad a las diferencias entre el grupo de pertenencia y el grupo externo, (3) la capacidad para el aprendizaje social de las tradiciones grupales y (4) la sensibilidad a lo apropiado. Examino la literatura sobre cognición en simios y presento evidencia empírica preliminar que apoya la existencia de normas sociales y normatividad ingenua en grandes simios. Aunque queda mucho trabajo empírico por hacer, espero haber ofrecido un marco teórico para estudiar la normatividad en otras especies y concluyo que deberíamos estar abiertos a la posibilidad de que la cognición normativa sea otro antiguo legado cognitivo que no es exclusivo de los seres humanos. Publicación original: Andrews, K. (2020). Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(1), 36-56. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.30 Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades 2021-11-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/34427 10.61377/ehc.34427 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; Vol. 6 No. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 179-203 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; Vol. 6 Núm. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 179-203 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; v. 6 n. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 179-203 2525-1198 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/34427/35631 Derechos de autor 2021 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |