Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina

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Three characteristics of Argentine federalism that hinder distributive equity are emphasized.  First, our federalism and its very high legislative malapportionment produce incentives for  the distributive agenda to be dominated by the territorial distribution of fiscal resources&am...

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Autor principal: Gervasoni, Carlos
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Centro de Estudios Avanzados 2024
Materias:
federalism
redistribution
equality
regressivity
revenue sharing
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/restudios/article/view/44504
Aporte de:
Estudios digital de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R334-article-44504
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spelling I10-R334-article-445042024-05-03T20:19:24Z Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina Federalismo regresivo: Tensiones entre distribución territorial e interpersonal del ingreso en la Argentina Gervasoni, Carlos federalism redistribution equality regressivity revenue sharing Three characteristics of Argentine federalism that hinder distributive equity are emphasized.  First, our federalism and its very high legislative malapportionment produce incentives for  the distributive agenda to be dominated by the territorial distribution of fiscal resources  among national and subnational governments, rather than by the interpersonal distribution  of income. Secondly, the territorial inequalities produced by the «geological lottery»  (geographic distribution of natural resources) is reinforced in our country by the allocation  of all royalties to the (typically rich) producing provinces. Finally, the co-participation law  itself mandates that some rich provinces receive much higher levels of federal transfers per  capita than other much poorer ones. These regressive aspects of our federalism probably  explain in part that, after long years of governments supposedly committed to  socioeconomic equality, the enormous increase in the size of the Argentine public sector  between the mid-2000s and the mid-2010s, and the implementation of some effectively  equalizing public policies, the country reaches its fourth decade of democracy with worse  levels of inequality than it had at the beginning of the current democratic period. Se enfatizan tres características del federalismo argentino que conspiran contra la equidad distributiva. En primer lugar, nuestro federalismo y su muy alto malapportionment legislativo producen incentivos para que la agenda distributiva esté dominada por la distribución territorial de los recursos fiscales entre los gobiernos nacional y subnacionales, más que por la distribución interpersonal del ingreso. En segundo lugar, las desigualdades territoriales producidas por la «lotería geológica» (distribución geográfica de los recursos naturales) es reforzada en nuestro país por la asignación del total de las regalías a las (típicamente ricas) provincias productoras. Finalmente, la propia ley de coparticipación manda que algunas provincias ricas reciban niveles mucho más altos de transferencias federales por habitantes que otras mucho más pobres. Estos aspectos regresivos de nuestro federalismo probablemente expliquen en parte que, luego de largos años de gobiernos supuestamente comprometidos con la igualdad socioeconómica, del enorme aumento del tamaño del sector público argentino entre mediados de los 2000 y mediados de la década de 2010, y de la implementación de algunas políticas públicas efectivamente igualadoras, el país llegue a su cuarta década de democracia con un nivel de desigualdad peor que el que tenía al inicio del actual período democrático. Centro de Estudios Avanzados 2024-03-12 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/restudios/article/view/44504 10.31050/re.vi51.44504 Estudios digital; Núm. 51 (2024): Federalismo, política, cultura y sociedad en América Latina; 13-27 1852-1568 0328-185X 10.31050/re.vi51 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/restudios/article/view/44504/44724 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-334
container_title_str Estudios digital
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic federalism
redistribution
equality
regressivity
revenue sharing
spellingShingle federalism
redistribution
equality
regressivity
revenue sharing
Gervasoni, Carlos
Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
topic_facet federalism
redistribution
equality
regressivity
revenue sharing
author Gervasoni, Carlos
author_facet Gervasoni, Carlos
author_sort Gervasoni, Carlos
title Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
title_short Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
title_full Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
title_fullStr Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Regressive Federalism: Tensions Between Territorial and Interpersonal Distribution of Income in Argentina
title_sort regressive federalism: tensions between territorial and interpersonal distribution of income in argentina
description Three characteristics of Argentine federalism that hinder distributive equity are emphasized.  First, our federalism and its very high legislative malapportionment produce incentives for  the distributive agenda to be dominated by the territorial distribution of fiscal resources  among national and subnational governments, rather than by the interpersonal distribution  of income. Secondly, the territorial inequalities produced by the «geological lottery»  (geographic distribution of natural resources) is reinforced in our country by the allocation  of all royalties to the (typically rich) producing provinces. Finally, the co-participation law  itself mandates that some rich provinces receive much higher levels of federal transfers per  capita than other much poorer ones. These regressive aspects of our federalism probably  explain in part that, after long years of governments supposedly committed to  socioeconomic equality, the enormous increase in the size of the Argentine public sector  between the mid-2000s and the mid-2010s, and the implementation of some effectively  equalizing public policies, the country reaches its fourth decade of democracy with worse  levels of inequality than it had at the beginning of the current democratic period.
publisher Centro de Estudios Avanzados
publishDate 2024
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/restudios/article/view/44504
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T21:14:23Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T21:14:23Z
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