Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy

The paper shows that the impossibility to reach a real exchange ratetarget, as proposed by the "Monetary Trilemma" can be circumvented byadding one policy instrument. In the choice between countercyclical fiscalpolicy and control of capital movements, the first one appears as thepreferred...

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Autor principal: Milei, Javier Gerardo
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2004
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3807
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spelling I10-R326-article-38072022-04-06T20:17:38Z Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy Real Exchange Rate Targeting: ¿Trilema Monetario o Control de Capitales? La Política Fiscal Milei, Javier Gerardo fiscal policy política fiscal The paper shows that the impossibility to reach a real exchange ratetarget, as proposed by the "Monetary Trilemma" can be circumvented byadding one policy instrument. In the choice between countercyclical fiscalpolicy and control of capital movements, the first one appears as thepreferred option, since it provides a stable equilibrium. Not only anequilibrium is not achieved in the second case, but the restrictions tocapital movements in an economy whith a low level of capitalization doesnot look like a sensible choice. En el presente trabajo se demuestra que la imposibilidad de alcanzar un objetivo de tipo de cambio real postulada por el trilema monetario se supera agregando un instrumento de política económica. Y ante la disyuntiva de elegir entre la política fiscal contracíclica y el control de capitales deberíamos inclinarnos por la primera ya que da como resultado un equilibrio estable, mientras que la segunda no, al margen de lo poco razonable que sería el control de capitales si la economía mostrara un bajo nivel de capitalización.     Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2004-12-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3807 10.55444/2451.7321.2004.v42.n2.3807 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 42 No. 2 (2004); 63-87 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 42 Núm. 2 (2004); 63-87 2451-7321 0034-8066 10.55444/2451.7321.2004.v42.n2 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3807/5006 Derechos de autor 2004 Javier Gerardo Milei http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-326
container_title_str Revista de Economía y Estadística
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic fiscal policy
política fiscal
spellingShingle fiscal policy
política fiscal
Milei, Javier Gerardo
Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
topic_facet fiscal policy
política fiscal
author Milei, Javier Gerardo
author_facet Milei, Javier Gerardo
author_sort Milei, Javier Gerardo
title Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
title_short Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
title_full Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
title_fullStr Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
title_full_unstemmed Real Exchange Rate Targeting: Currency or Capital Control Problem? Fiscal Policy
title_sort real exchange rate targeting: currency or capital control problem? fiscal policy
description The paper shows that the impossibility to reach a real exchange ratetarget, as proposed by the "Monetary Trilemma" can be circumvented byadding one policy instrument. In the choice between countercyclical fiscalpolicy and control of capital movements, the first one appears as thepreferred option, since it provides a stable equilibrium. Not only anequilibrium is not achieved in the second case, but the restrictions tocapital movements in an economy whith a low level of capitalization doesnot look like a sensible choice.
publisher Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba.
publishDate 2004
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3807
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T20:54:40Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T20:54:40Z
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