Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)

This paper explains the marked change in the relationship between the IMF and Argentina during the Alianza administration, which in a very short time went from a cooperative link, characterized by the adoption of a program in line with the Government’s interests and the granting of extraordinary cre...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Nemiña, Pablo
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti 2011
Materias:
Argentina
FMI
negociaciones
convertibilidad
default
IMF
negotiations
convertibility
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuarioceh/article/view/23019
Aporte de:
Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R307-article-23019
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R307-article-230192021-06-01T21:54:44Z Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001) Ajuste, crisis y default. El FMI y la Argentina durante la gestión de De la Rúa (1999-2001) Nemiña, Pablo Argentina FMI negociaciones convertibilidad default Argentina IMF negotiations convertibility default This paper explains the marked change in the relationship between the IMF and Argentina during the Alianza administration, which in a very short time went from a cooperative link, characterized by the adoption of a program in line with the Government’s interests and the granting of extraordinary credits, to one highly conflicted, reflected in the intolerance of the Fund to the successive failures of economic targets and, finally, the suspension of financing which determined the convertibility regime fell in late 2001. We study the negotiation process between the IMF and the Government from a twolevel scheme, which suppose that strategies determine the configuration and condition the outcome of negotiations. It is proposed that the coincidence of interests contributed to the relationship between the Fund and the Government was cooperative until early 2001, when the “blindaje” was granted. But the insistence on maintaining an unsustainable monetary and exchange regime, the tightened financial policy of the U.S. and the consolidation of an intransigent position in the IMF, weakened the bargaining position of the government and encouraged the implementation of a confrontative strategy by the organism. This determined the increase in conflicts in negotiations and established a less favorable scenario for continuing convertibility. El presente trabajo se propone explicar el marcado cambio en la relación entre el FMI y la Argentina durante la gestión de la Alianza, que en un lapso muy breve pasó de un vínculo cooperativo, caracterizado por la aprobación de un programa en línea con lo planteado por el gobierno y el otorgamiento de elevados créditos, a uno altamente conflictivo, reflejado en la intolerancia del Fondo ante los sucesivos incumplimientos de las metas económicas y, finalmente, la suspensión del financiamiento que determinó la caída del régimen de convertibilidad a finales de 2001. Se estudian los procesos de negociación entre el FMI y el gobierno a partir de un esquema de doble nivel, que supone que las estrategias determinan la configuración y condicionan el resultado de las negociaciones. Se propone que la coincidencia de intereses contribuyó a que la relación entre el Fondo y el gobierno fuera cooperativa hasta comienzos de 2001, cuando se otorgó el “blindaje”. Pero la insistencia en mantener un régimen cambiario-monetario insostenible, el endurecimiento de la política financiera de los EE. UU. y la consolidación de una posición intransigente en el FMI debilitaron la posición negociadora del gobierno y alentaron la implementación de una estrategia confrontativa por parte del organismo. Esto determinó el aumento de la conflictividad en las negociaciones y la configuración de un escenario menos favorable para la continuidad de la convertibilidad. Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti 2011-12-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuarioceh/article/view/23019 10.52885/2683-9164.v0.n11.23019 Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti; Núm. 11 (2011); 41-61 2683-9164 1666-6836 10.52885/2683-9164.v0.n11 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuarioceh/article/view/23019/22777 Derechos de autor 2011 Pablo Nemiña
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-307
container_title_str Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Argentina
FMI
negociaciones
convertibilidad
default
Argentina
IMF
negotiations
convertibility
default
spellingShingle Argentina
FMI
negociaciones
convertibilidad
default
Argentina
IMF
negotiations
convertibility
default
Nemiña, Pablo
Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
topic_facet Argentina
FMI
negociaciones
convertibilidad
default
Argentina
IMF
negotiations
convertibility
default
author Nemiña, Pablo
author_facet Nemiña, Pablo
author_sort Nemiña, Pablo
title Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
title_short Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
title_full Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
title_fullStr Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
title_full_unstemmed Fiscal tightening, crisis and default. The IMF and Argentina during De la Rúa's term (1999-2001)
title_sort fiscal tightening, crisis and default. the imf and argentina during de la rúa's term (1999-2001)
description This paper explains the marked change in the relationship between the IMF and Argentina during the Alianza administration, which in a very short time went from a cooperative link, characterized by the adoption of a program in line with the Government’s interests and the granting of extraordinary credits, to one highly conflicted, reflected in the intolerance of the Fund to the successive failures of economic targets and, finally, the suspension of financing which determined the convertibility regime fell in late 2001. We study the negotiation process between the IMF and the Government from a twolevel scheme, which suppose that strategies determine the configuration and condition the outcome of negotiations. It is proposed that the coincidence of interests contributed to the relationship between the Fund and the Government was cooperative until early 2001, when the “blindaje” was granted. But the insistence on maintaining an unsustainable monetary and exchange regime, the tightened financial policy of the U.S. and the consolidation of an intransigent position in the IMF, weakened the bargaining position of the government and encouraged the implementation of a confrontative strategy by the organism. This determined the increase in conflicts in negotiations and established a less favorable scenario for continuing convertibility.
publisher Centro de Estudios Históricos Profesor Carlos S. A. Segreti
publishDate 2011
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuarioceh/article/view/23019
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T20:25:47Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T20:25:47Z
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