Ponderability of lives in cases of state of necessity
Is it right to kill innocent people to save a larger number of them? In criminal legal dogmatic it is discussed if that homicidal action can be justified by the cause of the state of necessity. Based on respect for life (as a maximum, immeasurable legal good), freedom (no one can be used as a mer...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Derecho
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/nomeniuris/article/view/24214 |
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| Sumario: | Is it right to kill innocent people to save a larger number of them? In criminal legal dogmatic it is discussed if that homicidal action can be justified by the cause of the state of necessity. Based on respect for life (as a maximum, immeasurable legal good), freedom (no one can be used as a mere means to an end) and equality (no life is worth more than another), it is questioned that, in those cases, it is possible or morally correct to identify a preponderant interest, which is typical of the institute of reference: greater harm to avoid. This article attempts to reproduce the main arguments of that discussion and provide reasons to argue that, in tragic cases, it is possible to build a preponderant interest whose preservation justifies the homicidal action.
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