Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts

Kelsenian review model is characterized as a concentered constitutional review model which is lead by a special judge with a legal regulated competence. In contrast, the American model grants higher discretion to the controllers, characterized by the intentional omission of a normative framework; le...

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Autores principales: De Gaetano, Andrés M., Acheriteguy, Federico, Saltos Orrala, Miguel A., Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales - FD - UNC - CONICET 2022
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuariocijs/article/view/37530
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Sumario:Kelsenian review model is characterized as a concentered constitutional review model which is lead by a special judge with a legal regulated competence. In contrast, the American model grants higher discretion to the controllers, characterized by the intentional omission of a normative framework; leaving to judges the self-attributed monopoly of the constitutional review and the construction of its rules. As it results from an exploratory and comparative analysis process between Argentinian Supreme Court and the Ecuatorian constitutional court decisions, we are attending to an expansion of constitutional courts competitions, and an universalization of constitutional justice, which tends to weak the contradiction between the American and the Kelsenian constitutionals review model. This represents a process of mutual hybridization and convergence of the constitutional review models, produced by the transformation of their rules and its historical characteristics which the constitutional judges are doing through their sentences. This leads to ask ourselves if the jurisprudential transformation of the rules of constitutional review models is an attribution or an excess of the constitutional judges competences; which is finally placed them not only over the legislative power but also as higher as the constituent power.