Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts

Kelsenian review model is characterized as a concentered constitutional review model which is lead by a special judge with a legal regulated competence. In contrast, the American model grants higher discretion to the controllers, characterized by the intentional omission of a normative framework; le...

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Autores principales: De Gaetano, Andrés M., Acheriteguy, Federico, Saltos Orrala, Miguel A., Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales - FD - UNC - CONICET 2022
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuariocijs/article/view/37530
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spelling I10-R282-article-375302022-05-17T20:01:01Z Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts Hibridación y convergencia de los sistemas de control de constitucionalidad: Del poder constituyente al juez constitucional De Gaetano, Andrés M. Acheriteguy, Federico Saltos Orrala, Miguel A. Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana Control de constitucionalidad Modelos Reglas Estabilidad Justicia constitucional Kelsenian review model is characterized as a concentered constitutional review model which is lead by a special judge with a legal regulated competence. In contrast, the American model grants higher discretion to the controllers, characterized by the intentional omission of a normative framework; leaving to judges the self-attributed monopoly of the constitutional review and the construction of its rules. As it results from an exploratory and comparative analysis process between Argentinian Supreme Court and the Ecuatorian constitutional court decisions, we are attending to an expansion of constitutional courts competitions, and an universalization of constitutional justice, which tends to weak the contradiction between the American and the Kelsenian constitutionals review model. This represents a process of mutual hybridization and convergence of the constitutional review models, produced by the transformation of their rules and its historical characteristics which the constitutional judges are doing through their sentences. This leads to ask ourselves if the jurisprudential transformation of the rules of constitutional review models is an attribution or an excess of the constitutional judges competences; which is finally placed them not only over the legislative power but also as higher as the constituent power. El modelo kelseniano se caracteriza por un proceso de control concentrado a cargo de un juez especial con competencia reglada.En contraposición, el modelo norteamericano otorga mayor discrecionalidad a los controlantes, caracterizándose por la omisión intencional de un marco reglamentario, dejando librado a los jueces la auto atribución monopólica del ejercicio y el diseño de sus reglas. Tal como resulta de un proceso de relevamiento y examen jurisprudencial testigo que efectuamos sobre las sentencias de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación argentina y el Tribunal Constitucional Ecuatoriano en el marco de un proyecto investigativo comparativo entre ambos, asistimos auna expansión de la competencia de los tribunales constitucionales, y con ello a la universalización de la justicia constitucional, debilitandola concepción de los modelos tradicionales de control como binomios dicotómicos. Ello se traduce en un proceso de hibridación y convergencia de modelos y sistemas a través de la transformación de sus reglas de ejercicio y caracteres, que los jueces van haciendo a través de sus sentencias. Esto conduce a preguntarnos si la transformación jurisprudencial de las reglas de control es una atribución o un exceso del juez constitucional que termina por situarlo no sólo por encima del poder legislativo sino a la altura del poder constituyente. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales - FD - UNC - CONICET 2022-05-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuariocijs/article/view/37530 Anuario del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Núm. XX (2022): ANUARIO; 139-152 1667-6122 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuariocijs/article/view/37530/37624 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-282
container_title_str Anuario del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Control de constitucionalidad
Modelos
Reglas
Estabilidad
Justicia constitucional
spellingShingle Control de constitucionalidad
Modelos
Reglas
Estabilidad
Justicia constitucional
De Gaetano, Andrés M.
Acheriteguy, Federico
Saltos Orrala, Miguel A.
Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana
Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
topic_facet Control de constitucionalidad
Modelos
Reglas
Estabilidad
Justicia constitucional
author De Gaetano, Andrés M.
Acheriteguy, Federico
Saltos Orrala, Miguel A.
Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana
author_facet De Gaetano, Andrés M.
Acheriteguy, Federico
Saltos Orrala, Miguel A.
Gómez Villavicencio, Roxana
author_sort De Gaetano, Andrés M.
title Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
title_short Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
title_full Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
title_fullStr Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
title_full_unstemmed Hybridization and convergence of the Constitutional Review Models: from Constituent Power to Constitutional Courts
title_sort hybridization and convergence of the constitutional review models: from constituent power to constitutional courts
description Kelsenian review model is characterized as a concentered constitutional review model which is lead by a special judge with a legal regulated competence. In contrast, the American model grants higher discretion to the controllers, characterized by the intentional omission of a normative framework; leaving to judges the self-attributed monopoly of the constitutional review and the construction of its rules. As it results from an exploratory and comparative analysis process between Argentinian Supreme Court and the Ecuatorian constitutional court decisions, we are attending to an expansion of constitutional courts competitions, and an universalization of constitutional justice, which tends to weak the contradiction between the American and the Kelsenian constitutionals review model. This represents a process of mutual hybridization and convergence of the constitutional review models, produced by the transformation of their rules and its historical characteristics which the constitutional judges are doing through their sentences. This leads to ask ourselves if the jurisprudential transformation of the rules of constitutional review models is an attribution or an excess of the constitutional judges competences; which is finally placed them not only over the legislative power but also as higher as the constituent power.
publisher Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales - FD - UNC - CONICET
publishDate 2022
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/anuariocijs/article/view/37530
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