Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers

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The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it...

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Autor principal: Barberis, Sergio Daniel
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011
Materias:
conocimiento fenoménico
conciencia
atención
conceptos fenoménicos
punteros mentales
phenomenal knowledge
consciousness
attention
phenomenal concepts
mental pointers
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234
Aporte de:
Revistas de la UNC de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
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record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic conocimiento fenoménico
conciencia
atención
conceptos fenoménicos
punteros mentales
phenomenal knowledge
consciousness
attention
phenomenal concepts
mental pointers
spellingShingle conocimiento fenoménico
conciencia
atención
conceptos fenoménicos
punteros mentales
phenomenal knowledge
consciousness
attention
phenomenal concepts
mental pointers
Barberis, Sergio Daniel
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
topic_facet conocimiento fenoménico
conciencia
atención
conceptos fenoménicos
punteros mentales
phenomenal knowledge
consciousness
attention
phenomenal concepts
mental pointers
author Barberis, Sergio Daniel
author_facet Barberis, Sergio Daniel
author_sort Barberis, Sergio Daniel
title Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
title_short Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
title_full Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
title_fullStr Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
title_full_unstemmed Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
title_sort phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on jesse prinz’ theory of mental pointers
description The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2011
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234
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bdutipo_str Revistas
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