Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour

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This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of o...

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Autor principal: Danón, Laura
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011
Materias:
enfoque intencional
enfoque teleológico
atribución intencional
cognición animal
Filosofía de la mente
Cognicion animal
intentional stance
teleological stance
animal cognition
intentional attribution
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233
Aporte de:
Revistas de la UNC de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R10article-5233
record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic enfoque intencional
enfoque teleológico
atribución intencional
cognición animal
Filosofía de la mente
Cognicion animal
intentional stance
teleological stance
animal cognition
intentional attribution
spellingShingle enfoque intencional
enfoque teleológico
atribución intencional
cognición animal
Filosofía de la mente
Cognicion animal
intentional stance
teleological stance
animal cognition
intentional attribution
Danón, Laura
Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
topic_facet enfoque intencional
enfoque teleológico
atribución intencional
cognición animal
Filosofía de la mente
Cognicion animal
intentional stance
teleological stance
animal cognition
intentional attribution
author Danón, Laura
author_facet Danón, Laura
author_sort Danón, Laura
title Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
title_short Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
title_full Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
title_fullStr Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
title_full_unstemmed Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
title_sort intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour
description This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of over-attribution of intentional states that it comports. Secondly, I turn to Mark Okrent’s attempt to refine Dennett’s original position, by distinguishing between an intentional stance and a teleological one. Even when this strategy seems useful to deal with the problem of overattribution of intentionality, it faces its own problems. As I will try to show, there are behaviors of non-human animals that can be explained neither by the teleological stance, nor by the intentional stance. Finally, I will suggest that, in order to overcome this problem, Okrent’s requirements for the legitimate application of the intentional stance should be revised and mitigated.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2011
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5233
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AT danonlaura explicacionesintencionalesyexplicacionesteleologicasdelaconductaanimal
bdutipo_str Revistas
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