The problem of decision in multi-level governments

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What kind of impact do political arrangements which institutionalize at various levels of government the territorial distribution of political power have on the feasibility and viability of decision-making procedures? Starting whit this question from an analytical and neo-institutional perspective,...

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Autor principal: Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Derecho 2011
Materias:
innovación institucional
gobiernos multinivel
regla de la unanimidad
institutional innovation
multi-level governments
unanimity rule
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/6279
Aporte de:
Revistas de la UNC de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R10-article-6279
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R10-article-62792019-03-27T13:38:16Z The problem of decision in multi-level governments El problema de la decisión en los gobiernos multinivel Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo innovación institucional gobiernos multinivel regla de la unanimidad institutional innovation multi-level governments unanimity rule What kind of impact do political arrangements which institutionalize at various levels of government the territorial distribution of political power have on the feasibility and viability of decision-making procedures? Starting whit this question from an analytical and neo-institutional perspective, the paper reviews categories of decision in order to account for the constraints or difficulties inherent to governments which are made up of the competence design of their own jurisdictional framework that leads to the implementation of the unanimity rule for joint decisions. In order to test the hypothesis of work and by way of illustration, it is used the system of shared federal taxes in Argentina; parallel to this strategy, the argument will rest on the decision theory. ¿Cómo inciden sobre la factibilidad y viabilidad de la toma de decisiones, los diseños que institucionalizan en diversos niveles de gobierno la distribución territorial del poder político? Con este interrogante de partida y desde una perspectiva analítica neo-institucional, la ponencia revisa categorías de la decisión, a fin de dar cuenta de los constreñimientos o dificultades que presentan los gobiernos compuestos por el propio diseño competencial de su entramado jurisdiccional que conduce a la aplicación de la regla de la unanimidad para las decisiones conjuntas. Se utiliza para verificar la hipótesis del trabajo y de manera ilustrativa, el caso del sistema de la coparticipación federal de impuestos en Argentina, a la vez que se argumenta desde la teoría de la decisión. Facultad de Derecho 2011-11-16 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/6279 Revista de la Facultad de Derecho; Vol. 2 Núm. 2 (2011): Nueva Serie II 2314-3061 1850-9371 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/6279/7365 Derechos de autor 2011 Facultad de Derecho. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic innovación institucional
gobiernos multinivel
regla de la unanimidad
institutional innovation
multi-level governments
unanimity rule
spellingShingle innovación institucional
gobiernos multinivel
regla de la unanimidad
institutional innovation
multi-level governments
unanimity rule
Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo
The problem of decision in multi-level governments
topic_facet innovación institucional
gobiernos multinivel
regla de la unanimidad
institutional innovation
multi-level governments
unanimity rule
author Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo
author_facet Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo
author_sort Parmigiani de Barbará, Myriam Consuelo
title The problem of decision in multi-level governments
title_short The problem of decision in multi-level governments
title_full The problem of decision in multi-level governments
title_fullStr The problem of decision in multi-level governments
title_full_unstemmed The problem of decision in multi-level governments
title_sort problem of decision in multi-level governments
description What kind of impact do political arrangements which institutionalize at various levels of government the territorial distribution of political power have on the feasibility and viability of decision-making procedures? Starting whit this question from an analytical and neo-institutional perspective, the paper reviews categories of decision in order to account for the constraints or difficulties inherent to governments which are made up of the competence design of their own jurisdictional framework that leads to the implementation of the unanimity rule for joint decisions. In order to test the hypothesis of work and by way of illustration, it is used the system of shared federal taxes in Argentina; parallel to this strategy, the argument will rest on the decision theory.
publisher Facultad de Derecho
publishDate 2011
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refade/article/view/6279
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first_indexed 2022-08-20T01:21:57Z
last_indexed 2022-08-20T01:21:57Z
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