Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action

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By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking...

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Autores principales: Ibarra, Romina Alejandra, Amoruso, Lucía
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011
Materias:
acción intencional
intención en acción
representación motora
imágen motora
intentional action
intention in action
motor representation
motor image
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5230
Aporte de:
Revistas de la UNC de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R10-article-5230
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R10-article-52302019-05-15T15:36:36Z Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action Acción intencional, intención en acción y representaciones motoras: algunas puntualizaciones sobre la Teoría Causal revisada y su posible articulación con la neurofisiología de la acción Ibarra, Romina Alejandra Amoruso, Lucía acción intencional intención en acción representación motora imágen motora intentional action intention in action motor representation motor image By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking into account recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action. Particularly, by using the concept of motor representation. La introducción del concepto de intención en acción llevada a cabo por John Searle ha permitido resolver algunas de las principales dificultades a las cuales se venía enfrentando la Teoría Causal de la Acción. No obstante, su teoría impone, simultáneamente, nuevos desafíos. Dado lo anterior, el objetivo del presente artículo consiste en revisar algunas de las principales problemáticas que presenta la versión searleana de la Teoría Causal a la luz de los avances recientes en neurociencia cognitiva de la acción. Particularmente, a partir de la noción de representación motora. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011-05-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion revisión conceptual application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5230 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"; 12-19 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"; 12-19 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5230/5395 Derechos de autor 2011 Romina Alejandra Ibarra, Lucía Amoruso
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic acción intencional
intención en acción
representación motora
imágen motora
intentional action
intention in action
motor representation
motor image
spellingShingle acción intencional
intención en acción
representación motora
imágen motora
intentional action
intention in action
motor representation
motor image
Ibarra, Romina Alejandra
Amoruso, Lucía
Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
topic_facet acción intencional
intención en acción
representación motora
imágen motora
intentional action
intention in action
motor representation
motor image
author Ibarra, Romina Alejandra
Amoruso, Lucía
author_facet Ibarra, Romina Alejandra
Amoruso, Lucía
author_sort Ibarra, Romina Alejandra
title Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
title_short Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
title_full Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
title_fullStr Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
title_full_unstemmed Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
title_sort intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised causal theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action
description By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking into account recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action. Particularly, by using the concept of motor representation.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2011
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5230
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first_indexed 2022-08-20T00:49:12Z
last_indexed 2022-08-20T00:49:12Z
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