Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina

This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the r...

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Autor principal: Porto, A.
Otros Autores: Sanguinetti, P.
Formato: Capítulo de libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2001
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100 1 |a Porto, A. 
245 1 0 |a Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina 
260 |b Blackwell Publishing Ltd  |c 2001 
270 1 0 |m Sanguinetti, P.; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Miñones 2157, Buenos Aires 1428, Argentina; email: sanguine@utdt.edu 
506 |2 openaire  |e Política editorial 
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504 |a Porto, A., (1990) Federalismo Fiscal: El Caso Argentino, , Instituto Torcuato Di Tella-Editorial Tesis, Buenos Aires 
504 |a Porto, A., Sanguinetti, P., Descentralización fiscal en América Latina: El caso Argentino (1993) Serie Política Fiscal, , No. 45, CEPAL/GTZ. Santiago de Chile 
504 |a Raimondo, H., The political economy of state intergovernmental grants (1983) Growth and Change, 14, pp. 17-23 
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504 |a Sanguinetti, P., The politics of intergovernmental transfers and local government deficits: Theory and evidence (1993) Estudios Económicos, 8, pp. 87-109 
504 |a Sanguinetti, P., Tommasi, M., (2000) Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior: Insurance Versus Aggregate Discipline, , Serie Seminarios, Instituto y Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires 
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520 3 |a This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.  |l eng 
593 |a Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Mĩones 2157, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina 
593 |a Universidad Nacional de La Plato, Argentina 
690 1 0 |a CAPITAL PROVISION 
690 1 0 |a FEDERAL SYSTEM 
690 1 0 |a POLITICAL ECONOMY 
651 4 |a ARGENTINA 
700 1 |a Sanguinetti, P. 
773 0 |d Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2001  |g v. 13  |h pp. 237-256  |k n. 3  |p Econ. Polit.  |x 09541985  |t Economics and Politics 
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