The informal regulation of criminal markets in Latin America
"This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Solo para usuarios autorizados, varios accesos simultáneos |
| Aporte de: | Registro referencial: Solicitar el recurso aquí |
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| 008 | 240813t20222022enka ob 001 0 eng | ||
| 020 | |a 9781009170710 |q (electronic publication) | ||
| 020 | |a 1009170716 |q (electronic publication) | ||
| 020 | |a 9781009186346 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1009186345 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |z 9781009170727 |q (hardcover) | ||
| 020 | |z 9781009170703 |q (paperback) | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1452238995 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)on1452238995 | ||
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| 049 | |a U@SA | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HV5840.L3 |b F56 2022eb | |
| 099 | |a Recurso electrónico en INTERNET | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Flom, Hernán. | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The informal regulation of criminal markets in Latin America |h [recurso electrónico] / |c Hernán Flom. |
| 300 | |a 1 recurso en línea (xvi, 254 p.) : |b il. | ||
| 516 | |a Libro electrónico. | ||
| 504 | |a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (229-244) e índice. | ||
| 538 | |a Modo de acceso: Disponible en línea a través de Internet. | ||
| 500 | |a Título tomado de la pantalla de presentación (visto 13 de agosto de 2024) | ||
| 505 | 2 | |a 1. Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America -- 2. Theory of Drug Market Regulation -- 3. Particularistic Confrontation: The Persistent War between Gangs and Police in Rio de Janeiro -- 4. Particularistic Negotiation: The Decentralization of Police Corruption and Increase in Violence in Rosario, Santa Fe -- 5. Coordinated Protection: The Consolidation of Centralized Corruption in Buenos Aires -- 6. Coordinated Coexistence: The Consolidation of a Police-Gang Truce in São Paulo -- 7. Regulation of Criminal Markets in Weak Institutional. | |
| 520 | |a "This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries with weak institutions, police act as interlocutors between criminals and politicians. It shows that whether and how politicians control their police forces explains the prevalence of different informal regulatory arrangements to control drug markets. Using detailed case studies built on 180 interviews in four cities in Argentina and Brazil, the book reconstructs how these informal regulatory arrangements emerged and changed over time"--Descripción del editor. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Drug control |z Latin America. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Drug dealers |z Latin America. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Drug traffic |z Latin America. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Control de drogas |z América Latina. |2 UDESA | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Narcotraficantes |z América Latina. |2 UDESA | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Tráfico de drogas |z América Latina. |2 UDESA | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |z Solo para usuarios autorizados, varios accesos simultáneos |u https://research.ebsco.com/c/2sy7jc/search/details/zsi3yj7us5?db=nlebk |