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211126s1991 nyub b 001 0 eng d |
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|a 9780801424861
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|a (OCoLC)1286369945
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|a DS559.8.M44
|b W57 1991
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| 100 |
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|a Wirtz, James J.,
|d 1958-
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4 |
|a The Tet offensive :
|b intelligence failure in war /
|c James J. Wirtz.
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|a Ithaca :
|b Cornell University Press,
|c 1991.
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| 300 |
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|a x, 290 p. :
|b mapas ;
|c 25 cm.
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| 490 |
1 |
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|a Cornell studies in security affairs
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|a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 277-283) e índice.
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|a Introduction -- Part I. "The big victory, the great task": 1. The Communist debate over strategy -- 2. Plans, preparations, and objectives of the Tet Offensive -- Part II. The origins of surprise: 3. The sources of American biases -- 4. Missing the signals: July-November 1967 -- 5. Missing the signals: December 1967-30 January 1968 -- 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive -- Conclusion: Explaining the failure of intelligence.
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|a "In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response." --Descripción del editor.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Tet Offensive, 1968.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Vietnam War, 1961-1975
|x Military intelligence.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Vietnam War, 1961-1975
|z United States.
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Ofensiva del Tet, 1968.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Guerra de Vietnam, 1961-1975
|x Inteligencia militar.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Guerra de Vietnam, 1961-1975
|z Estados Unidos.
|2 UDESA
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| 830 |
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0 |
|a Cornell studies in security affairs
|