The theory of incentives : the principal-agent model /

Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun...

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Autor principal: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1947-2004
Otros Autores: Martimort, David
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2002.
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Acceso en línea:Contributor biographical information
Table of contents
Publisher description
Aporte de:Registro referencial: Solicitar el recurso aquí
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100 1 |a Laffont, Jean-Jacques,  |d 1947-2004. 
245 1 4 |a The theory of incentives :  |b the principal-agent model /  |c Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort. 
260 |a Princeton, N.J. :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c c2002. 
300 |a xii, 421 p. :  |b ill. ;  |c 26 cm. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 399-412) and indexes. 
505 0 |a Incentives in Economic Thought -- Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture -- Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management -- Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem -- Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting -- Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies -- Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance -- Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives -- Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination -- Incentives in Planned Economies -- Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design -- Auctions -- The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off -- The Basic Model -- The Complete Information Optimal Contract -- Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts -- Information Rents -- The Optimization Program of the Principal -- The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off -- The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information -- 
505 0 |a Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing -- The Revelation Principle -- A More General Utility Function for the Agent -- Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints -- Commitment -- Stochastic Mechanisms -- Informative Signals to Improve Contracting -- Contract Theory at Work -- Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection -- More than Two Types -- Multidimensional Asymmetric Information -- Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives -- Random Participation Constraint -- Limited Liability -- Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification -- Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off -- Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs. 
520 |a Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. 
650 0 |a Economics. 
650 0 |a Incentives in industry. 
650 7 |a Economía.  |2 UDESA 
650 7 |a Incentivos en la industria.  |2 UDESA 
700 1 |a Martimort, David. 
856 4 2 |3 Contributor biographical information  |u http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/bios/prin051/2001051039.html 
856 4 1 |3 Table of contents  |u http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/2001051039.html 
856 4 2 |3 Publisher description  |u http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/2001051039.html