Liquidity protection versus Moral Hazard: the role of the IMF
This paper develops a simple game between the IMF a county and a set of atomistic private investors. The model is motivated by the case of Argentina. Under reasonable assumptions, the one shot game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider- ing an equilibrium in mixed strategies, conditio...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Documento de trabajo acceptedVersion |
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Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Escuela de Negocios. Centro de Investigaciones en Finanzas (CIF)
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/utdt/6262 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | This paper develops a simple game between the IMF a county and a set of atomistic private investors. The model is motivated by the case of Argentina. Under reasonable assumptions, the one shot game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider- ing an equilibrium in mixed strategies, conditions are derived on whether the IMF should exist. A “cooperative first best” may be supported in a repeated game by a “minimum punishment strat- egy” that may be optimal but may break down if the probability of insolvency rises. This implies that countries are likely to de- viate in bad times placing the IMF in an “impossible position”. It is suggested that the international financial architecture (IFA) remains incomplete. |
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