Pragmatism, method, and education: Dewey and Rorty on How We Think
In this article, we analyzed Richard Rorty’s critique of John Dewey’s appeal to the “experimental method.” We argue that Rorty’s categorical dismissal of the link between Dewey’s pragmatism and his conception of method would have been either nuanced or radically different, had he seriously considere...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Sociedad Argentina de Analisis Filosofico
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | http://pa.bibdigital.ucc.edu.ar/3306/1/A_Saharrea_Viale.pdf |
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| Sumario: | In this article, we analyzed Richard Rorty’s critique of John Dewey’s appeal to the “experimental method.” We argue that Rorty’s categorical dismissal of the link between Dewey’s pragmatism and his conception of method would have been either nuanced or radically different, had he seriously considered the importance that reflection on education had for the philosopher of Vermont. Our interpretive strategy is supported by Henry Cowles’ recent recovery of Dewey’s appeal to the experimental method in How We Think (1910 first edition, 1933 second edition) —one of his most important educational texts— which presents the relevant ties between pragmatism, evolutionism, and method. This historical and conceptual framework will allow us to question Rorty’s reconstruction of this aspect of Deweyan philosophy taking into account, mainly, his own reflections on education. |
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