The redistributive effects of centralization and decentralization across subnational units
Abstract: Several scholars havearguedthat decentralization benefits statesand municipalities, grantingthemmoreautonomyfor managing theirbudgets andmoreresources to deliver theirservices. Othershavequestioned this assertion, claiming that decentralization makes subnational units morefiscallydepend...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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Latin American Studies Association
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17079 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | Abstract: Several scholars havearguedthat decentralization benefits statesand municipalities,
grantingthemmoreautonomyfor managing theirbudgets andmoreresources to
deliver theirservices. Othershavequestioned this assertion, claiming that decentralization
makes subnational units morefiscallydependent oncentral governments. This articleargues
that thefiscal impactofdecentralization must bedifferentiated across states. It
theoretically specifies and empirically demonstrates whichstates benefit during periods
of decentralization andcentralization. It argues that powerful presidents whocentralize
resources have imposed greater costson moredeveloped andfiscally independent districts
(which prefer to administertheirown resources and can beserious challengers to
presidential power), thus relyingmainlyonsupportfrom lessdeveloped andmorefiscally
dependent provinces, whichprefer moreredistribution. I present empirical evidence for
Argentina (1983-2004), a developing federation with stronggovernors and highcrossregional
inequality, anddiscuss someimplications for comparative studieson the topic. |
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