Buying stones: welfare spending and protests in Argentina, 2008–2019
Abstract Why do some governments manage to curb protest while others cannot and turmoil escalates to a social outbreak? This study proposes a theoretical argument that specifies how discretionary spending reduces conflict, highlighting the role of social movements in managing protests. It examin...
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/15174 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | Abstract
Why do some governments manage to curb protest while
others cannot and turmoil escalates to a social outbreak?
This study proposes a theoretical argument that specifies how discretionary spending reduces conflict, highlighting the role of social movements in managing
protests. It examines this and alternative arguments in
Argentina, a country with strong social movements and
historically large mobilizations, using statistical analysis with an original database on protests and a population of 364 national government programs between
2008 and 2019. The article makes a contribution by finding a differential effect between specific types of social
spending, programmatic and discretional, and protests.
It also specifies the linkage between the main variables
using qualitative evidence during two presidencies. The
goal of discretionary distribution is not to win an election but to ensure governance. The article finally raises
some comparative implications on the role of social
movements and welfare spending in Latin America. |
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