The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
Ockham proposed two consecutive theories about the nature of common concepts or universals. In parallel to these two theories, Ockham proposed two theories about the nature of propositions. This article has two interrelated goals. First, to reveal that Ockham's first theory of the nature of pro...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14593 |
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| Sumario: | Ockham proposed two consecutive theories about the nature of common concepts or universals. In parallel to these two theories, Ockham proposed two theories about the nature of propositions. This article has two interrelated goals. First, to reveal that Ockham's first theory of the nature of propositions solves only two of the three problems that contemporary propositional realism conceives in some of its arguments, while the second theory solves three of those problems. In each case, however, Ockham attributes the same characteristics and functions to propositions as contemporary literature. Secondly, my goal in this article is to reveal that, by observing those characteristics and functions of propositions, it is clear that Ockham's theories about propositions are consistent with a single theory about the nature of judgments, and apprehensions, two different types of propositional attitudes. |
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