INFLACIÓN, RECESIÓN Y DESEQUILIBRIO EXTERNO. LA CRISIS DE 1952, EL PLAN DE ESTABILIZACIÓN DE GÓMEZ MORALES Y LOS DILEMAS DE LA ECONOMÍA PERONISTA
This article analyzes the economic crisis of 1952, and the implementation and impact of the “Economic Emergency Plan”. Moving away from explanations that holds up that Peronist government initiated a change of course in answer to the severe economic downturn, this article analyzes the making of the...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/boletin/article/view/6765 |
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| Sumario: | This article analyzes the economic crisis of 1952, and the implementation and impact of the “Economic Emergency Plan”. Moving away from explanations that holds up that Peronist government initiated a change of course in answer to the severe economic downturn, this article analyzes the making of the first post-war argentine stabilization plan. Based on confidential documents of the economic cabinet led by Alfredo Gómez Morales, we evaluate the essential guidelines of the program, the internal disputes over measures to be taken to deal with recession, and economic and social constraints. In this respect, the article contributes to a broader discussion of the complex linkages between peronism, “populism” and economy. |
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