La Ley de homicidio y Orestes de eurípides* por Judith flEtchEr** ...

At the center of Euripides' Orestes, produced in 408 BCE, is the Argive trial of Orestes for matricide, a revision of Aeschylus' Eumenides, produced fifty years earlier, which aligned his trial with the foundation of the Areopagus. That same year, 408, Athens re-inscribed Draco's homi...

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Autor principal: Fletcher, Judith
Otros Autores: Gallegos, Luciana, trad.
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones 2017
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Acceso en línea:http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=juridica&cl=CL1&d=HWA_3925
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/juridica/index/assoc/HWA_3925.dir/3925.PDF
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Sumario:At the center of Euripides' Orestes, produced in 408 BCE, is the Argive trial of Orestes for matricide, a revision of Aeschylus' Eumenides, produced fifty years earlier, which aligned his trial with the foundation of the Areopagus. That same year, 408, Athens re-inscribed Draco's homicide law; a surviving fragment suggests that the stone was meant to be an exact replica of the original inscription on wood. This article explores the connection between these two re-inscriptions (the law and the tragedy). There is a strong emphasis on legal process in Orestes, without any reference to Athenian homicide law although the procedure for homicide is inconsistent: there are apparently two mutually exclusive processes in Argos (an assembly trial and exile) and a third prescribed by Apollo. Nonetheless the play deliberately cites language from the trial of Orestes in Eumenides. The Aeschylean play celebrates a putative legal unity, a single authoritative means of treating homicide by putting it under the jurisdiction of impartial judges authorized by a goddess. Orestes disputes the ideological fantasy of closure obtained through a single divinely authorized court by complicating and compromising the adjudication of the matricide in Argos. Does Orestes validate the perfection of the Areopagus by constructing its opposite in Argos? Or does it realistically admit that any legal system is a complex hybrid whose many facets can never be perfectly reconciled? These possibilities are explored in the context of the controversial legal history of late fifth-century Athens.