Descripción
Sumario:The party-switching phenomenon has taken on such a dimension and bears such relevance that it exerts an enormous impact on how political representation in a rule of law with multiparty democracy is conceived today. Political representativeness stems from ballot box results which proceed from the elected representative's political adherence to a certain political party - therefore, when a House Representative or a Senator decides unilaterally not to join the parliamentary bloc under which sponsorship he/she ran for office, or, more frequently, to desert such bloc to join another, there appears a distortion of the said representativeness. This study will firstly observe the conceptual delimitation of party-switching to go on to study the conformation of single-member party parliamentary blocs. On the basis that party-switching is an element that distorts the normal functioning of political representation in Congress, we will consider the Argentine constitutional doctrine, which maintains that in the case of the House of Representatives, the seats belong to the representatives and not to the political parties; this study will also analyze the so-called "borocotization" of the Argentine political system. Secondly, we will examine the role of political parties in the National Senate, where, in contrast to the House of Representatives, seats are allotted to political parties. In addition, we will review the regulations for single-member party blocs in both chambers. Lastly, we will present proposals brought forward by the National Congress for the regulation of party-switching.