3048
Over the last few decades, many modern democracies have experienced an increasing judicialization of the most fundamental political dilemmas. Notwithstanding this changes in the role of judges, traditional legal scholarship still asserts that knowledge of judicial decision-making is exclusively link...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/pensar-en-derecho/revistas/4/la-eleccion-de-jueces-constitucionales-en-las-democracias-actuales.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pensar&cl=CL1&d=HWA_3048 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pensar/index/assoc/HWA_3048.dir/3048.PDF |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | Over the last few decades, many modern democracies have experienced an increasing judicialization of the most fundamental political dilemmas. Notwithstanding this changes in the role of judges, traditional legal scholarship still asserts that knowledge of judicial decision-making is exclusively linked to the study of positive law, based of the myth that judges are "a unique body of impervious legal technicians above and beyond the political struggle". In this context, and considering the recent debates regarding the "Judicial Reform" in Argentina, this article proposes to discuss seriously the rule of law and the role of judges, revisiting the judicial appointment processes and the selection of "constitutional judges" in modern democracies. The aim of this article is to compare and discuss alternative institutional models that take into account how judges actually make decisions. In this article, it will be argued that the appointment of constitutional judges in a modern democracy requires the recognition of the political role of those judges that are entrusted the constitutional review of legislation as well as the myriad of factors that may influence judicial decisions. For those reasons, the article concludes that judicial independence will not be met depoliticising the judicial appointment process but rather recognising and making explicit political attitudes, and accepting the political pluralism in all the braches of government. |
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